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Viewing cable 05MADRID655, NSDD 38: Department of Homeland Security/U.S.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05MADRID655 2005-02-18 16:04 2010-12-18 12:12 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Madrid
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000655

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR M/R

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AODE AMGT APER ECON EWWT ASEC PTER KMRS SP
SUBJECT: NSDD 38: Department of Homeland Security/U.S.
Customs and Border Protection - Permanent Staffing of
Container Security Initiative Teams in Spain

REF: (A) STATE 014517, (B) STATE 066580

1. Summary. Embassy Madrid supports the establishment of a
new CSI program in Spain. This program would enhance
Mission's MPP goal of prevention and response to terrorism.
In order to effectively meet the duties required of CSI
Spain, Embassy requires personnel and operational control
changes to the proposed DHS NSDD 38. Embassy has
determined that eight permanent Americans are warranted at
ports in Spain, but the proposed criminal investigator and
intelligence positions in Madrid are only authorized a
three month TDY status to evaluate their contribution to
the initiative. Embassy has also determined an additional
locally engaged support staff will be required for DHS
Madrid to meet the needs of this program. Operational
control for CSI in Spain must be based with the Chief of
Mission and staff in Madrid. The program cannot move
forward until the government of Spain signs a Memorandum of
Understanding that allows DHS personnel status as
Administrative and Technical Staff. End Summary.

Personnel
---------

2. Embassy has reviewed Reftel (A) NSDD 38 request and
approves establishment of eight new, full-time, permanent
(FTP), American direct-hire (USDH), DHS/CBP Container
Security Initiative (CSI) positions at these locations in
Spain: Algeciras (2), Barcelona (3), and Valencia (3).

3. However, for Madrid, embassy approves two (2) positions
requested in reftel (A) on a three-month TDY basis, and
reiterates a request for one (1) Mission Support Specialist
position (Locally Engaged Staff), on a permanent basis.
Total positions approved equal eleven (11), eight (8) of
which are permanent, direct hires; one (1) of which is
permanent, locally engaged; and two (2) of which are TDY.

4. Post's decision on the Madrid positions is based on the
interest of remaining lean and reducing layers of personnel
who might duplicate work. Mission is therefore limiting
the criminal investigator and intelligence positions to a
TDY trial period. At present, post remains unconvinced of
the need for additional criminal investigators or analysts
due to the ample presence of U.S. law enforcement personnel
currently in Madrid. The evaluation period will allow DHS
to justify the positions without increasing the overlapping
jurisdictions of agencies already at post.

Operational Control
-------------------

5. Mission seeks to clarify DHS/CBP's justification for
placing operational control under CBP Headquarters.
Mission believes that operational control should reside
with the Chief of Mission through the DHS chief in Madrid.
Overall program direction can remain with Office of
International Affairs, CBP in Washington.

Administrative Support
----------------------

6. Administrative support for the proposed DHS/CBP
Container Security Initiative is dependent first and
foremost on the successful negotiation of a bilateral
agreement or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
Government of Spain (GOS) that resolves two primary issues:
the official status, privileges and immunities of deployed
personnel and family members, and the provision of adequate
and secure office space within the designated port areas.

Official Status -- Privileges and Immunities
--------------------------------------------

7. It is Mission Spain's intention to negotiate an MOU in
which the GOS affords the proposed DHS/CBP CSI personnel
and their family members a status equivalent to that given
to the Administrative and Technical staff members of the
Embassy and their family members in accordance with the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18,
1961, or consular employees in accordance with the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. Spain is a signatory to
the Vienna convention, and has signed a similar bi-lateral
agreement regarding Mission Spain's NASA representative.
In addition, the USG has afforded Administrative and
Technical status to the Educational Counselors of the GOS
currently deployed in 23 different states in the U.S. Thus,
there is both precedence and reciprocity to support our
request for DHS/CBP CSI. This agreement must be signed
before DHS/CSI personnel can apply for visas to deploy to
Spain to fill any permanent positions approved by this
NSDD-38 process. Prior to this agreement, DHS/CBP CSI
personnel deployed to Spain will be subject to individual
country clearance approval and restricted to three-month
temporary duty (TDY) assignments as governed by the maximum
length of official visas for temporary visits.

Provision of Office Space
-------------------------

8. As the Algeciras pilot project has shown, DHS/CBP CSI
personnel must have office space within the port in order
to perform their duties effectively. Commercial office
space outside the port areas will be significantly less
effective, and will be very difficult and expensive to
lease and make-ready to meet security standards.
Therefore, it is vitally important that the MOU with the
GOS include provision of office space within the port
areas. If successful, this will limit start-up costs to
procurement/shipping of office furnishings and equipment,
and installation of commercial voice and data links.

9. Office space in Madrid can be made available for the
permanent support position within the CAA adjacent to other
DHS and law enforcement agency personnel. For the two TDY
positions in Madrid, office space can be made available on
a temporary basis. Should the positions become permanent,
an estimate of dislocation and make-ready costs will be
prepared.

Provision of Housing
--------------------

10. Post recommends that proposed DHS/CBP CSI positions be
authorized Living Quarters Allowance (LQA) for residential
accommodations in Algeciras, Valencia and Barcelona, plus
full shipment of household effects and personally owned
vehicles.

11. Should the two TDY positions in Madrid become
permanent, they could join the embassy's short-term leased
housing pool, appliance pool, and residential maintenance
services.

ICASS Services and Costs
------------------------

12. The eight proposed permanent DHS/CBP CSI positions in
Algeciras, Valencia and Barcelona would be eligible to
receive the following ICASS services from Mission Spain:
Basic Package, Security Services, Health Services, CLO
Services, Procurement, Customs/Shipping, Vouchering,
Accounts and Records, Pouch and Mail, and Leasing Services.
Many of these services would be modified to less than full
services due to the geographical distance between these
cities and the service providers in Madrid. We believe
sufficient administrative support can be provided as long
as DHS/CBP CSI personnel have daily access to the embassy
through commercial Internet and telephone. The current-
year (FY-05) ICASS charge for the CSI pilot project TDY
personnel is $38,300. This NSDD-38 request would affect
service subscriptions and workload counts for next fiscal
year (FY-06). Cost estimates are highly dependent on
currently unknown variables such as the number of family
members. However, an estimated cost for minimal FY-06
ICASS services is about $100,000. Pending ICASS Council
approval, Mission Spain Management Section would utilize
these resources to establish one new locally engaged staff
position.

Security
--------

13. Mission believes that additional staff can be justified
and do not offer unnecessary security risk providing DHS
personnel posted at satellite locations carefully observe
security issues relevant to outside of Embassy locations.
In addition to the mandatory pre-assignment security
briefing, Mission RSO recommends careful attention to
office, residential and personal security measures. DHS
personnel located at satellite posts will need to take
greater responsibility for their own security awareness.
Residences and offices will require security evaluation by
Mission security personnel. DHS must be cognizant that
locating Americans in port areas creates an additional
target.


14. Mandatory Personal Security Training. All personnel
transferring to an overseas location under COM authority
must complete appropriate overseas personal security
training prior to their travel. Please refer to reftel (B)
for details. Additionally, the CSI personnel should
schedule a security briefing with Embassy Madrid RSO as
soon as possible after arrival. Embassy ID card will be
issued and personnel will receive briefing on current
threat levels in Spain as well as appropriate residential
and personal security measures.

15. The NSDD-38 Decision.

1) Is the need for the proposed staffing change reflected
in the most recent MPP? If so, under which goal? If not,
what circumstances have changed to justify the NSDD 38
proposal?

Yes. Goal One - Prevention and Response to Terrorism.
The CSI program fits within Strategy 2: Strengthen
bilateral law enforcement, judicial, military, financial
and intelligence cooperation and information sharing
related to the War on Terror (including ETA).

2) If the agency proposes to add staffing based on
workload, are there other resources already present at post
that are performing or could perform the function?

No. This is a new initiative. The new staff will be
integrated into the mission hierarchy by reporting to
DHS' ICE Attache in Madrid and to the Chief of
Mission.

3) Could the function be accomplished through the use of
TDY, Foreign National, contract, or other local hire
personnel?

During the pilot phase, the program requires
management and development by an American staff.
These positions will be privy to secret and possibly
top secret information. It is possible that the
program will continue to require involvement of
cleared Americans to deal with classified information.
However, we will review the program once it is
established, to determine if some of the staffing
could be taken over by locally hired or contract
employees.

4) Identify the specific administration support, space, and
funding arrangements that have been made for the increase
in staffing.

Provision of space - see paragraph 5
ICASS services and costs - see paragraph 9

5) Do the benefits of increasing the staff outweigh the
inherent security risks associated with additional
personnel?

Yes. The mission of DHS/ICE includes oversight of the
Container Security Initiative, a program designed to
preclude the introduction of weapons of mass
destruction in the U.S. via commerce and achieve a key
y
MPP Goal. CSI personnel can also limit additional
security risk by being cognizant of their security
needs and cooperation with Madrid's Regional Security
Office.

17. Approval is subject to DHS/CBP acceptance of above
conditions and ICASS charges.

MANZANARES