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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW821, RUSSIAN MIDDLE CLASS NOT DEAD YET?
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MOSCOW821 | 2009-04-01 14:02 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO6429
PP RUEHDBU RUEHHM
DE RUEHMO #0821/01 0911401
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011401Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2655
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXI/LABOR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000821
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, DRL
NSC FOR ELLISON
DOL FOR BRUMFIELD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2019
TAGS: ELAB ECON EIND PGOV SOCI RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MIDDLE CLASS NOT DEAD YET?
REF: MOSCOW 03242 2008
Classified By: EconMinCouns Eric T. Schultz, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
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SUMMARY
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¶1. (C) Leading Russian sociologists concur the GOR missed the
chance to invest in the middle class during the economic
boom. As a result, the middle class remains only
approximately 20 percent of the population. That said,
experts assert that the small middle class is nonetheless
well positioned to weather the current crisis owing to its
savings and human capital. Moreover, they see the middle
class less as a revolutionary class than an inert mass,
inclined to support the administration. Neither sociologists
nor the administration consider the middle class a threat to
the regime, even in the throes of an economic downturn. As
such, the government has decided to focus its anti-crisis
resources on blue-collar workers instead of providing the
support and institutional reform needed for middle class
development -- and ultimately the innovation economy that
Medvedev and Putin advocate. End Summary.
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MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVING, BUT NOT THRIVING
----------------------------------------
¶2. (U) During last month's annual conference on the
sociopolitical challenges of the 21st century, sponsored by
the Independent Institute for Social Politics (ISP), panels
of sociologists and economists, many of whom advise President
Medvedev, said the Russian middle class would survive the
economic crisis but would not thrive. Igor Yurgens, of the
Institute for Modern Development, opened the conference by
underscoring the GOR's neglect of investment in the public
and social institutions necessary to nurture the middle class
during the eight year economic boom that coincided with Prime
Minister Putin's presidency. The opportunities provided by
massive petrodollar inflows were now gone, he stated. Owing
to the government's failure to capitalize on these
opportunities and the reversal in Russia's economic fortunes,
the vertical impetus for social mobility had stopped
functioning.
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, further stressed the lack of
quantitative middle class growth in spite of Russia's
economic prosperity. She used studies from 2000 and
2007 to demonstrate that the size of the middle class
remained relatively constant, at anywhere from 12 to 20
percent of the population. By her estimate, the core of the
middle class was between 5-7 percent of the population,
although by lowering the income standards and the standard
set for social and professional status, the middle class
would then range between 12-20 percent of the population. In
her calculations, the middle class was made up primarily of
managers of large companies, bank directors, financial
specialists, business owners (restaurants, retail trade),
part of the intelligentsia, and middle to high-level
bureaucrats. The latter category had grown during the crisis
(owing to the slowdown in the private sector), and she said,
now comprised about a quarter of the middle class.
---------------------------
GETTING THROUGH THE CRISIS
---------------------------
¶4. (C) During a separate meeting with us, XXXXXXXXXXXX
claimed that the fall in real incomes, not job losses, was now the
biggest threat to middle class prosperity. XXXXXXXXXXXX
estimated that middle class incomes would shrink this year by
10 to 15 percent with a negative GDP growth rate of 3.5 percent.
(In comparison middle class incomes dropped by 25 percent during
the 1998 crisis). She added that the "core" of the middle
class had actually contracted slightly, from 6.9 to 5.3
percent, which she said was probably due to the fact that a
number of white collar workers (bankers, managers, as well as
small and medium sized entrepreneurs) had fallen out of the
middle class since the beginning of the crisis. She
contended, however, that the employment situation with the
middle class had for the most part stabilized.
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the middle
class had certain "cushions" which gave it an advantage
over the blue collar, or poorer classes during the crisis.
First of all, many of the middle class had accumulated
MOSCOW 00000821 002 OF 003
savings during the boom years (comprising between seven to
10 percent of their total incomes, or the equivalent of four or
five monthly salaries). Between October 2008 and February
2009, they tended to take advantage of the GOR's gradual
devaluation to purchase foreign exchange, trade it for rubles,
and then purchase large consumer items and durables, such
as automobiles and refrigerators, which were priced in rubles.
She said as of February, however, the middle class "consumer binge"
had pretty much run its course owing to the decline in real
incomes, depletion of personal savings, and persistent
inflation.
-----------------
NOT REVOLUTIONARY
-----------------
¶6. (C) Despite claims by political activists like Garry
Kasparov that the middle class will create "problems" for the
administration when job cuts start and salaries freeze, most
sociologists here portray the middle class as a conservative
force rather than a potentially disgruntled constituency
eager to defend its interests. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued
the number of "entrepreneurs" within the middle class had
not grown during the Putin years. He claimed virtually all
of the growth had come instead from the rise of government
bureaucrats who benefited from impressive pay increases
under Putin. As a result, the mentality of the middle class
has shifted considerably away from the more
independent and market-oriented conceptions of the
Yeltsin-era (in which entrepreneurial types dominated).
¶7. (C) During the Putin era, Russia has developed what
XXXXXXXXXXXX termed a "third world" middle class
with a conservative mentality, shaped by hierarchical thinking,
and largely risk averse. Indeed, according to his research,
the core of the middle class has now absorbed much of the
bureaucratic worldview of the majority. This explains the
broad support for Putin and Medvedev across society, the
power of social conservative values, and a reluctance to
challenge authority.
¶8. (C) Paradoxically, Russia's youthful middle class is more
Western in its lifestyle, but still very anti-Western in its
politics, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. She sees Russia's
young "social innovators" (her company eschews the term
"middle class" as too controversial) as characterized by a more
Western lifestyle, including the willingness to take bank loans,
use the internet, pay for fitness centers, etc. Their better
education makes them mentally more flexible but does not make
them more politically liberal. Far from afraid of the
economic downturn, most are confident that their abilities
allow them to re-invent themselves and adapt to challenges.
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX commented to us that today's
youth are firmly indoctrinated in a "patriotic" mindset that
blames the US and the West for much of Russia's ills.
They remain largely apolitical, but more attuned to the
interests of the state, rather than the rights and opportunities
of the individual. As such, he sees Russia's youth as more inclined
to rally in defense of the state than to agitate for revolutionary
change.
--------------------------------------------- --
MIDDLE CLASS WELL POSITIONED, BUT LACKS SUPPORT
--------------------------------------------- --
¶10. (C) That said, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX
told us in separate meetings that the middle class still had the best
chance of stimulating Russia's development in the post-crisis world.
It had invested more in its own human capital (education and training)
during the high growth years; whereas the lower socio-economic strata
used most of their new-found cash to purchase basic consumer items.
In addition, the middle class had acquired work experience and
professional skills enabling them to adapt to shifts in labor market
demand. Blue-collar households, in contrast, were suffering
disproportionately from inflation, down-sizing, and salary
reductions. XXXXXXXXXXXX concluded the middle class
would be the best candidate for supporting collaboration
between the state, society, and private sector to address
Russia's economic problems.
¶11. (U) However, these analysts pointed out that the GOR's
focus on blue-collar workers in its anti-crisis measures had
MOSCOW 00000821 003 OF 003
deprived the middle class of resources and opportunities to
stimulate growth or reform. According to Tambovtsev, the
main hope for middle class to play a transitional role in
society lay in small business entrepreneurship.
Unfortunately, the absence of secure property and contract
rights, a biased judiciary, and administrative barriers
impeded SME growth. Falling consumption was also hurting
SME's, which tended to orient themselves toward household
consumers. Without the resources and institutional reforms
necessary to improve their productivity, middle class
entrepreneurs were unlikely to serve as a strong
countermeasure to current economic trends.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶12. (C) While not dead, the Russian middle class does not
show signs of rapid growth in the near term, nor does it seem
likely to be the engine of democratic change in Russia.
Better equipped to deal with the downturn than the working
classes but politically inert, the middle class poses little
threat to political and social stability. Moreover, despite
the administration's emphasis on preparing for post-crisis
development through innovation and small/medium businesses,
the most likely candidate to help the government achieve
those aims -- the middle class -- has largely been ignored by
the state. We expect this process to continue: budget
constraints will leave minimal resources for cultivating the
human capital of the middle class. End Comment.
BEYRLE