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Viewing cable 09STATE32931, AUSTRALIA GROUP: GUIDANCE FOR INFORMAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE32931 2009-04-03 20:08 2011-02-01 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2931 0932115
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 032058Z APR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
INFO AUSTRALIA GROUP COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0000
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 032931 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: GUIDANCE FOR INFORMAL 
INTERSESSIONAL MEETING IN LONDON, APRIL 6-7, 2009 
 
REF: 08 THE HAGUE 876 
 
Classified By: Robert Mikulak, Dir., ISN/CB Reason: 1.4 (c) and 1.4 (d)

1.(U) This message provides guidance for the U.S. delegation to the Australia Group's informal intersessional meeting in London on April 6-7, 2009.

---------- OBJECTIVES ----------

2. (C) Principal U.S. objectives for the informal intersessional meeting are: -- Ensure that AG participants do not reopen the implementation policy proposals that were resolved at the October 8-9, 2008 intersessional meeting in The Hague (reftel). -- Discourage weak or extraneous controls on software related to dual-use chemical and biological equipment. -- Encourage AG participants to consider making policy proposals and information exchange presentations at the upcoming Australia Group plenary, tentatively scheduled for 21-25 September in Paris. -- Present on the outcomes of recent efforts to reach out to the U.S. gene synthesis industry to raise awareness about potential for misuse and encourage AG participants to re-engage in expert and policy-level discussions of how to address advances in synthetic genomics. -- Avoid any substantive discussion of the Mirazayanov book "State Secrets: An Insider's View of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program" or so-called 'Fourth Generation Agents.'

---------------------- CHEMICAL CONTROL LISTS ----------------------

3. (SBU) During the informal intersessional meeting, the Del: -- Should encourage robust discussion of the UK's proposal to add a footnote to the Chemical Weapons Precursors control list that clarifies the nature of the Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers on the list (AG/Mar09/CL/GB/67). Some chemicals have multiple CAS numbers that represent different isotopes or states, but the AG's chemical list and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) schedules only contain one CAS number per compound. Resolving this issue will be important to both AG and CWC implementation. -- Should discourage AG participants from changing the understanding reached during The Hague intersessional meeting in October 2008 with regard to software to include chemical spectra. Chemical spectra are available in several public databases, which obviates the point of export controls. The del should ensure any discussions of how AG participants should interpret the software control do not increase or decrease its scope. -- Should express its satisfaction with the outcome of The Hague interessional meeting with regard to the joint U.S.-UK proposal to clarify the control of cross (tangential) flow filtration equipment (AG/Apr08/CL/USA/15 and AG/Apr08/CL/GB/33). We do not intend to continue pursuing the proposal at this time. Though we still believe the terms 'sterilized' and 'disinfected' are sub-optimal, it seems unlikely that AG members will find a better parameter at this time.

-------------------------------- SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID SEQUENCES --------------------------------

4. (SBU) The Del should make a presentation on efforts by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to reach out to the U.S. gene synthesis industry regarding how to handle suspicious orders of synthetic nucleic acids. The Del should also circulate a nonpaper on the U.S. effort to develop customer and sequence screening guidance for the gene synthesis industry.

------------------ ANY OTHER BUSINESS ------------------

5. (SBU) The Del should emphasize that the AG's decision to conduct a systematic review of its control lists is an opportunity for AG participants to raise any issues they encountered when implementing AG rules.

6. (SBU) The Del should also encourage AG participants to consider making presentations during the information exchange meeting at this year's plenary session.

7. (C) If AG participants raise the issue of Vils Mirazayonov's book "State Secrets: An Insider's View of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program," the Del should: -- Report any instances in which the book is raised. -- Not/not start or provoke conversations about the book or engage substantively if it comes up in conversation. -- Express a lack of familiarity with the issue. -- Quietly discourage substantive discussions by suggesting that the issue is 'best left to experts in capitals.' CLINTON