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Viewing cable 10CAIRO165, Sudan: NCP Cairo Head Evaluates U.S. and Egyptian Roles

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10CAIRO165 2010-02-04 15:03 2011-02-16 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXRO6316
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0165/01 0351608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041550Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0146
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE
IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 000165 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/04 
TAGS: PREL SU EG
SUBJECT: Sudan: NCP Cairo Head Evaluates U.S. and Egyptian Roles 
 
REF: 09 CAIRO 1615; 09 CAIRO 1506 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Donald A. Blome, Minister Counselor, DoS, ECPO; 
REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
1. (C) Key Points: 
 
 
 
-- The Head of the Sudanese National Congress Party's (NCP) office 
in Cairo, Kamal Ali, told us he was working with the Government of 
Egypt (GoE) to organize the logistics so Sudanese in Cairo can vote 
in the Sudanese Presidential election.  The Government of Sudan 
(GoS) also asked Egypt and the Arab League to provide monitors for 
the election in Sudan. 
 
 
 
-- Ali said Egypt's motivations in Sudan are circumspect because of 
its focus on Nile waters. 
 
 
 
-- According to Ali, the U.S. role has an important role in 
resolving problems in Sudan, but the policy of pressure has divided 
the GoS into pro- and anti-engagement factions. 
 
 
 
-- Ali believes financial incentives should be offered to South 
Sudan to ensure unity because succession will lead to war. 
 
 
 
-- The GoS has taken steps to increase security and provide 
humanitarian assistance in Darfur, which led to the return of some 
IDPs, according to Ali.  However, it is unable to negotiate with 
the Darfuri rebel leaders because the rebels are not united and key 
leaders refuse to come to Doha. 
 
 
 
-- Ali believes pressure needs to be exerted on France to bring 
Abdel Wahid Al Nur to the negotiation table and push Chadian 
President Deby to "conclude the peace agreement with Sudan."  End 
Key Points. 
 
 
 
2. (C) Comment: Ali's assertion that Egypt is only concerned with 
Nile waters probably results from recent, intensive GoE efforts to 
solidify the two countries' position on the Nile Basin Initiative 
(NBI) and counter efforts by the other seven NBI countries to 
impose an agreement that Egypt opposes (reftels A-B).  The GoE is 
not only concerned about access to Nile waters, but is also 
concerned that instability in Sudan could result in large flows of 
refugees into Egypt as occurred during the North-South civil war. 
End Comment. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
NCP Preparing Working with Egypt to Hold  Presidential Election 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
 
 
3. (C) Kamal Ali, Head of the Sudanese National Congress Party's 
(NCP) office in Cairo told us on February 2 that the NCP had helped 
its supporters to register to vote in Cairo in the upcoming April 
Presidential elections.  He said the NCP was educating local 
Sudanese on the voting process because most Sudanese in Cairo will 
be participating in their first election. According to Ali, the GoS 
is working with the GoE to organize and provide security for voting 
centers in Cairo, Alexandria and Aswan.  He said Khartoum had asked 
Egypt and the Arab League to help monitor elections in Sudan. 
 
 
 
4. (C) Despite this cooperation, Ali said Egypt would have a 
limited role to play in Sudan because "its actions are circumspect 
due to Cairo's singular focus on Nile waters."  He said Chad and 
Libya are the two neighboring countries best place to help to 
resolve the situation in Darfur. 
 
CAIRO 00000165  002 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
USG Role Important, Policies Should Be Fact-Based 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
 
5. (C) Ali said the NCP was skeptical that the USG would honor the 
elections if the NCP were to win.  He stated that many in the NCP 
"expect the U.S. to react like it did when HAMAS won elections in 
Palestine in 2006."  Nevertheless, Ali praised the role of S/E 
Gration in working with the NCP-led government to resolve the 
problems in Sudan. He said the U.S. can play a positive and 
significant role, but expressed frustration that the USG's policy 
of pressuring Khartoum was unwarranted given the USG-GoS 
cooperation on counterterrorism, Darfur, CPA implementation and 
democratic transformation. He bemoaned that despite these "positive 
actions," Sudan is still on the USG's list of states that support 
terrorism and subject to economic sanctions. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Two Trains of Thought on Future Engagement 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
6. (C) Ali said there were two trains of thought within the 
Sudanese Government on future cooperation with the USG.  The 
pro-engagement group, led by Ghazi Salahuddin, believed that the 
U.S. was an essential partner and bilateral engagement should 
continue despite "the lack of USG rewards" to this point.  Ali 
stated that the pro-engagement group was still preeminent, but was 
losing ground to the anti-engagement group, which believed that the 
lack of tangible benefits was a signal that the U.S. was not 
interested in a bilateral relationship and the group advocated that 
Sudan should halt all concessions. 
 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Southern Secession Will Lead to Conflict 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
7. (C) Ali stated that many in the GoS are resigned to the 
inevitable secession of the South and believe it may be for the 
best. However, he believes that despite the best intentions of 
Khartoum and Juba, the secession of South Sudan will lead to war 
because it is in the "nature of the region."  He said historical 
disputes, migratory patterns of indigenous tribes, uncertainty over 
border demarcation, and the lack of consensus on Abyei, the Nuba 
Mountains and Blue Nile state are "time bombs for renewed 
conflict." 
 
 
 
8. (C) Ali believes that it is best to promote unity by offering 
South Sudan financial incentives. He told us that some leaders in 
the NCP believe it would be best to "give South Sudan 100% of the 
revenue from the southern oil fields in exchange for preserving the 
unity of the country."  According to Ali, this would avoid a 
conflict that would stop oil revenues altogether and address 
concerns that a new South Sudan would foment instability in the 
region. 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
Doha Talks "Just Words" 
 
----------------------- 
 
CAIRO 00000165  003 OF 003 
 
 
9. (C) Ali said the GoS has shown its willingness to engage in 
talks with the Darfuri rebels to resolve the crisis in the Darfur 
region.  However, he said up to this point the Doha talks "resulted 
in just words and no action."  According to Ali, the blame for the 
lack of a resolution in Darfur lies with the Darfuri rebel groups, 
which are not united, and key leaders, such as Abdel Wahid Al Nur, 
who  are not willing to participate in talks with the government, 
without securing "large, personal benefits."  He stated that 
Khartoum has taken tangible steps to increase security in Darfur 
and improve the humanitarian situation.  According to Ali, the 
return of some IDPs to their villages is proof that the GoS has 
acted in good faith to improve conditions in Darfur. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Pressure on France Needed to Resolve Darfur 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
10. (C) Ali said the recent agreement between Chad and Sudan was a 
positive step to resolve the Darfur crisis.  He told us that the 
GoS is working to remove Chadian opposition groups from the border 
area.  He said Chad needs to reciprocate by taking steps to do the 
same with JEM to "conclude" the agreement. 
 
 
 
11. (C) Ali believes France holds the trump cards to resolving the 
Darfur conflict.  He said Washington needs to pressure Paris to 
bring Abdel Wahid Al Nur to the negotiation table and get the 
French Government to push Chadian President Deby to "conclude the 
peace agreement with Sudan." 
SCOBEY