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2006-04-10 19:22:00
06MEXICO1889
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 001889 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016 
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL MX
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD'S 
APRIL 17-18 VISIT TO MEXICO 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Antonio O. Garza for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Mexico is the essential partner in U.S. 
homeland defense, and while the Mexican Navy (Marina)  has 
been an enthusiastic  player, the Mexican military (SEDENA) 
has only recently begun to acknowledge the benefits of 
cooperation.  This visit marks the opportunity to realign our 
own posture vis-a-vis Mexico to give it the stature it merits 
in our own security strategies, but also to build Mexico's 
acceptance of its strategic role in North America.   What we 
do in the coming months is crucial foundation for the 
military-to-military opportunities we can forge with Mexico's 
incoming civilian and military leaders.  End Summary 
 
Two Services, Two Approaches 
 
¶2.  (C)  Mexico generally remains cognizant of historical 
military confrontations with the U.S. and extremely sensitive 
to perceived slights or embarrassments.  Within the military 
Marina has been most able to overcome that, especially post 
9/11, and has quickly embraced the need for close cooperation 
on counter-terrorism, narcotics interdiction, potential 
interception of weapons of mass destruction, and the range of 
missions necessary to keep North America secure.  SEDENA has 
traditionally been suspicious and aloof, in part to disguise 
lack of capability.  In recent months, however, we have seen 
a new openness within SEDENA to accepting a relationship with 
NORTHCOM, observing U.S. military exercises, and of course 
providing unprecedented assistance during Hurricane Katrina 
relief efforts.  This visit gives us the opportunity to 
recognize Marina's ongoign partnership and open the door to a 
similar relationship with SEDENA.  The tools we suggest: 
 
--  Waiver for American Servicemembers' Protection Act 
(ASPA)/Nethercutt Sanctions:  Mexico ratified the Treaty of 
Rome in 2005, and as required by ASPA/Nethercutt we have 
terminated ESF, IMET and FMF, the latter two targetted 
primarily towards Marina.  These programs were essential to 
Marina's counter-terrorism preparedness which benefits not 
only Mexico but the U.S.  President Fox, Foreign Minister 
Derbez, and both houses of the Mexican Congress have resolved 
not to sign an Article 98 agreement with the U.S.  A waiver 
directly serves our security interests. 
 
-- Major Non-NATO Ally Status:  President Bush met last week 
with President Fox and Canadian Prime Minister Harper to 
discuss regional security and prosperity.  Our regional 
security efforts are enhanced if all three partners have the 
opportunity and responsibility to be equal players.  The U.S. 
and Canada are, of course, NATO members.  Making Mexico a 
Major Non-NATO Ally opens up additional resources for 
cooperation, training and engagement.  It also provides 
Mexico with a status nearer to that of Canada and the U.S. -- 
and a greater responsibility to improve its capabilities to 
meet the common standard.  While the foreign Ministry (SRE) 
has signalled sensitivty to becoming a formal "ally" of the 
United States, careful explanation of what being a Major 
Non-NATO Ally entails should help mitigate that.  We have 
informally raised this with military leaders who have 
encouraged us to raise the possibility with President Fox. 
 
-- Joint Political-Military Talks:  Mexico is one of the few 
countries in the region to still have a military Defense 
Secretary, and that is unlikely to change soon.   As our 
 
SIPDIS 
homeland security, disaster relief and counter-terrorism 
missions and scenarios bridge the military and civilian 
sectors, we believe building dialogue and cooperation between 
civilian and military experts is a valuable tool for both 
countries.  Mexico has just scheduled Pol-Mil talks with 
Canada, setting a precedent we would like to follow. 
 
Non-Proliferation 
 
¶3.  (C)  Mexico is generally a strong proponent of 
non-proiferation.  In January it signed the International 
Convention for the Repression of Nuclear Terroist Acts.  We 
have pressed the Secretary of Foreign Relations to endorse 
the Proliferation Security Initiative, (PSI), so far without 
result although they have no raised specific objections.  . 
 
Political Constraints 
 
¶4.  (C)  Mexico is in the last two months of an historic 
presidential campaign which any one of the three major 
parties could win -- polls have them in a technical tie at 
this point.  The outcome is unlikely to change military 
missions dramatically:  All three presidential candidates 
favor continued military participation in drug eradication 
and interdiction, and have postulated an increased military 
role in border security.  Two of the three candidates would 
 
MEXICO 00001889  002 OF 002 
 
 
probably continue Mexico's resistance to getting involved in 
international peacekeeping operations.  If the National 
Action Party (PAN) is re-elected it would certainly press for 
a greater military role in PKOs.  Regardless of who wins, 
General Vega will resign and the incoming president will 
select a new Secretary of Defense from the ranks of the 
lieutenant generals (generales de division).   Under General 
Vega SEDENA has suggested it is politicians who set 
constraints on what the military can do.  However, in the 
last year NORTHCOM has hosted two Mexican Senate delegations 
the members of which seemed very open to increased engagement 
with the U.S.  A new Mexican Secretary of Defense may provide 
us the opportunity to open up unprecedented military 
cooperation with Mexico if we have put the tools in place. 
 
¶5.  (C)  These are crucial last months of the Fox 
administration, as the Mexican President looks to fortify his 
legacy as the leader who brought democratic transition and 
modernization to Mexico.  Fox must be politically cautious 
not to "surrender" to the U.S.  He is also eager for 
recognition for his administration's unprecedented 
counter-terrorism and security cooperation with us. 
Spiraling violence on the border shadows real progress on 
other fronts.  The three initiatives suggested above could 
find a receptive audience with President Fox, and could lay 
the foundation for a new, invigorated military-to-military 
relationship with the incoming administration. 
 
 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity 
 
GARZA