VZCZCXRO8174
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTC #2047/01 2630538
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200538Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6854
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4157
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0419
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2016 
TAGS: PREL ENRG MASS NATO OSCE PHUM UN NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/U.S.: PDAS VOLKER DISCUSSES BILATERAL 
RELATIONS, NATO 
 
REF: A. A...



79047,9/20/2006 5:38,06THEHAGUE2047,"Embassy The
Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,06THEHAGUE2024,"VZCZCXRO8174
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTC #2047/01 2630538
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200538Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6854
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4157
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0419
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE
HAGUE 002047
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2016
TAGS: PREL ENRG MASS NATO OSCE PHUM UN NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/U.S.: PDAS VOLKER DISCUSSES BILATERAL
RELATIONS, NATO
REF: A. A) THE HAGUE 2024
¶B. B) THE HAGUE 2023
¶C. C) THE HAGUE 1991
¶D. D) THE HAGUE 1978
Classified By: Amb Roland Arnall; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: During his September 12 visit to The Hague,
EUR PDAS Volker discussed the road to Riga, detainee policy,
Lebanon, ICTY compliance (septel), Guatemala's UNSC bid,
contacts with Syria (ref b), OSCE reform and presidency, the
Arms Trade Treaty concept, JSF, and energy security. He met
with GONL officials, parliamentarians, and journalists, and
delivered a speech to the influential Netherlands Atlantic
Association. Volker defended U.S. detainee policy, saying
that President Bush recognized the need to address negative
perceptions and is working with Congress to reach a
comprehensive legal solution. Following up on discussions
held September 8 by visiting USNATO Permrep Nuland (ref c),
Volker underlined the importance of two issues: resolving
troop shortfalls in Afghanistan, and making progress on the
global partnership initiative. End summary.

¶2. (C) Volker held in-depth discussions with Dutch
interagency representatives, including MFA Deputy Director
General for Political Affairs Wim Geerts; MFA Director of
Security Policy Robert de Groot; the Prime Minister's Foreign
Policy Advisor, Karel van Oosterem; and MOD Deputy Director
for Defense Policy, Jan Geert Siccama.

The road to Riga
----------------

¶3. (C) Geerts pressed for a unifying political message at
Riga, and reiterated Dutch concern that explicitly stating
NATO is a global organization would be divisive. He
suggested emphasizing NATO's role ""as an organization with
the knowledge and capabilities for stabilization operations""
worldwide. He feared that there was still not enough
substance on the agenda for Riga, and thought that French
obstructionism - which he termed worse than at any other time
in recent memory - was largely to blame. He argued for
including the EU and UN on the margins, an idea Volker
discouraged. MOD's Siccama suggested that the NATO Response
Force (NRF) be declared fully operational at Riga, even if
not all the requirements had actually been met.

Georgia Intensified Dialogue and Enlargement
--------------------------------------------

¶4. (C) France, Germany and the UK are all concerned about
Georgian volatility, said Volker, and this is causing them to
second-guess themselves on the Intensified Dialogue. But ID
for Georgia would, he said, actually contribute to stability.
The U.S. would prefer, Volker added, that the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) meet prior to the September 21 Ministerial in
New York, so that Ministers could openly discuss the decision
afterward. De Groot said the Dutch could go either way.

¶5. (C) De Groot and Geerts repeated Dutch concerns that
Ukrainian membership apirations were moving in the wrong
direction and that now was not the time to discuss expansion.
Volker urged the Dutch to support at least mentioning the
aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia. He recommended the
summit document say that enlargement has historically been a
success and that it set a date certain for Balkans decisions.
He said we needed to hear from Ukraine how it wanted to
proceed with NATO, and support them as far as they were
prepared to go at this time.

Global Partnership
------------------

¶6. (C) NATO needs to develop its ability to work together
with partners around the world, to deal with emerging crises,
said Volker. We need one toolbox, he added, without
firewalls. He acknowledged that Japan and Korea have shown
only lukewarm interest in open-ended consultations, to which
Geerts replied the Dutch are keen to try, with one or two
other countries, to prepare an options paper. De Groot
suggested the Germans might be useful in this, though it
needed to be discrete and done outside the NATO conference
rooms. Volker said he would be interested in helping shape
any Dutch ideas on the subject discreetly in advance, and we
should in any case see how the discussions go in New York, as
this will be an issue we expect Ministers to discuss.
Afghanistan

THE HAGUE 00002047 002 OF 004
-----------

¶7. (C) The Dutch repeated their frustration with Karzai (ref
c) and hoped we would press him while he was in Washington.
The army and police needed to be adequately paid, and they
needed uniforms and resources. Geerts said he had traveled
with PM Balkenende in August to Afghanistan, and it was his
distinct impression that Karzai says all the right things but
delivers nothing. Karzai has no policy, no reconciliation
program in the South, de Groot contributed, adding, ""We can't
win with this."" Geerts suggested the need for increased
consultation in Kabul among allied representatives, to bring
more pressure on Karzai. He echoed the U.S. suggestion (ref
c) that NATO senior civilian representative, Dutch Ambassador
Daan Everts, take the lead. Volker floated a suggestion,
that Afghan Coordinators from NATO allies might also get
together prior to Riga.

¶8. (C) Geerts said that ISAF must make progress on the ground
before the onset of winter. Volker noted that NATO must also
resolve the ISAF troop shortfall, prior to Riga. He
expressed support for Dutch and UK efforts on that. If
Afghanistan is in bad shape when leaders gather at Riga, it
could overshadow the summit. But if we do our job well be
fore Riga, Afghanistan would be one example among many of how
NATO is fulfilling global responsibilities.

UNSC GRULAC race: Dutch still playing it close
--------------------------------------------- -

¶9. (C) Volker urged the Dutch to support Guatemala's lobbying
effort, particularly in Asia and Africa, where we think the
race will be decided. He asked the Dutch to consider the
credibility of the UN, particularly in the U.S. Congress, if
Venezuela were to gain a seat. Chavez would use the UNSC, he
said, to support the ""Bolivarian Revolution"" elsewhere in
South America, to attack the U.S. and to make life easier for
rogue states.

¶10. (C) Guatemala, by contrast, is democratic, has made
tremendous human rights gains, and is a contributor to UN
peacekeeping operations (including the DRC, where they lost
eight troops). ""We are not seeing strong views,"" coming from
the EU, he added. Geerts responded, de rigour, ""Venezuela is
a neighboring country of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. We
will act discreetly."" In a separate meeting with MFA
Director General for Political Affairs Pieter de Gooijer,
Ambassador Arnall and Volker again raised the issue. De
Gooijer quietly affirmed that he expected The Netherlands to
support Guatemala.

Lebanon
-------

¶11. (C) The GONL is still considering the possibility of
sending a frigate, said Geerts, to operate with the Germans
under NATO auspices. The cabinet will look into it, he said,
but not if the Lebanese maintain their insistence on a 6 mile
barrier. Geerts then turned to Lebanon reconstruction,
expressing interest in the results of the joint U.S.-UK
assessment mission. Volker expressed our concern that the
money get to the right people, and put forward the idea of a
trust fund, in case some allies wanted to contribute but did
not have sufficient personnel to place on the ground. The
Dutch, who had proposed a NATO clearinghouse possibility,
expressed interest.

OSCE: Dutch support Kazakh bid
------------------------------

¶12. (C) Volker acknowledged continuing Russian efforts to
constrain OSCE democracy promotion efforts, but said that we
were hopeful of closing out the reform package. We are
trying to shine the spotlight, he said, on frozen conflicts
and increase attention to proper treatment of NGOs. He added
that we absolutely will not consider raising our contribution
when the budget is reviewed under the Spanish chairmanship.

¶13. (C) Volker said the Kazakhs were receiving mixed messages
on their bid for Chairman in Office, including expressions of
German support. Geerts said that FM Bot, too, had recently
informed the Kazakhs that the GONL would support their bid.
Volker replied that a Kazakh presidency now would not be
credible, given Kazakhstan's recent election and lack of
progress on democracy. An OSCE Chairman on Office needs to
represent fulfillment of OSCE principles. We have told them
that we would be willing to support them later, he said,
provided their actions reflect OSCE principles on democracy.
Volker said that to unravel this, we should support Greece
THE HAGUE 00002047 003.3 OF 004
for 2009, Lithuania for 2010 and consider Kazakhstan again
for 2011.

Arms Trade Treaty
-----------------

¶14. (C) Geerts said that The Netherlands supports giving a
group of experts a mandate to explore the possibilities of
such a treaty. The Dutch are remaining quiet in their
support, though, to avoid the perception that the treaty is a
""western"" idea. He hoped that the U.S. would not vote
against the measure, at the UNGA.

Joint Strike Fighter
--------------------

¶15. (C) Geerts and de Groot believed the prosepcts of a JSF
MOU prior to the November 22 elections looked increasingly
unlikely. Labor (PvdA), they said, is clearly coming out
against JSF, and it is far from certain that sufficient votes
exist to gain approval prior to Parliament's November 1
pre-election recess. Geerts added that the issue had become
extremely sensitive. Volker urged the Dutch to make the case
for JSF.

Energy security
---------------

¶16. (C) The Netherlands, said Geerts, wanted to avoid
becoming overly dependent on Russian energy. They needed to
secure alternate sources , he said, and at the same time have
options to make life difficult for the Russians. Some EU
countries would, he believed, allow energy concerns to affect
their relations with Russia. He liked the language developed
for the Energy Security Conference, scheduled for this spring
but cancelled. He suggested we continue a dialogue on this.

Detainee issues: Dutch criticism remains heated
--------------------------------------------- --

¶17. (C) MFA Director General for Political Affairs Pieter de
Gooijer dedicated his entire 30 minute meeting with Volker to
detainee issues. De Gooijer was focused exclusively on the
delicate situation in which Foreign Minister Bot has found
himself (refs a and d), and the need for us to be sensitive
to this in our public statements and meetings with
parliamentarians.

¶18. (C) Parliamentarians Bert Koenders and Hans van Baalen,
foreign policy spokesmen for the Labor Party (PvdA) and the
conservative Liberals (VVD), respectively, both focused
largely on detainee issues. Koenders, a strong supporter of
the transatlantic relationship, was one of the instigators of
the parliamentary debate on secret prisons (ref a). As van
Baalen explained, in a separate meeting, President Bush's
speech September 6 provided the ideal opportunity for the
left to attack the credibility of Bot and his governing
Christian Democrats. Van Baalen, whose Liberals are junior
coalition partners, added, though, that even within his own
party, there was real concern that the U.S. was drifting away
from shared transatlantic values. He said that he shared
concern over lack of due process in secret prisons, but
promised that Liberal criticism would remain well-reasoned as
long as he was around.

¶19. (U) In talks with de Gooijer, Koenders, and van Baalen,
as well as in remarks to the Netherlands Atlantic Association
and interviews with journalists, Volker vigorously defended
the President's decisions on removing all detainees from CIA
detention facilities, guaranteeing ICRC access, and
guanranteeing appropriate treatment under Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions, the Detainee Treatment Act and the
newly issued Army Field Manual. Questions dealt almost
exclusively with detainee issues and Dutch concern that U.S.
detainee policy had strayed from a commitment to rule of law
and due process. Volker emphasized repeatedly that this was
not the case, and indeed that President Bush had taken steps
to comprehensively address the legal issues, treatment
issues, and underlying values issues that had been of concern
to many Europeans. Volker explained that the President had
now gone to Congress and was asking it to consider
legislation that would provide a comprehensive legal solution
to the problems encountered in the war on terror, consistent
with the recent Supreme Court ruling.

¶20. (U) Despite Volker's repeated focus on the positive
decisions taken by the President, Dutch media chose to focus
coverage of his visit on the fact that, while the detainees
THE HAGUE 00002047 004 OF 004
had been removed from CIA detention, the CIA program itself
remained in place. These stories, in turn, factored into
Dutch parliamentary hearings on the subject on September 13,
and prompted several prominent politicians (including FM Bot,
Koenders, and van Baalen) to express deep disappointment with
the U.S. position.

¶21. (U) PDAS Volker cleared on this cable.
ARNALL