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Viewing cable 07BOGOTA1033, NEW CRIMINAL GROUPS ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT THREAT,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07BOGOTA1033 | 2007-02-13 17:05 | 2011-03-04 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks |
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #1033/01 0441719
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131719Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2681
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7403
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8676
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB LIMA 4746
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9975
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5402
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3885
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001033
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO SNAR PREF
SUBJECT: NEW CRIMINAL GROUPS ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT THREAT,
SHADOW OF EX-PARAMILITARIES
REF: A. 06 BOGOTA 4750
¶B. 06 BOGOTA 10691
¶C. 06 BOGOTA 6262
¶D. 07 BOGOTA 581
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) The GOC and OAS say the new criminal groups that have
appeared in certain regions lack the organization, reach, and
military capacity of the former AUC. Rather, they are
primarily decentralized criminal operations that have used
some demobilized paramilitaries, as well the former AUC's
informant and drug processing/distribution networks, to
continue narcotrafficking and other illegal activities. To
date, the GOC's efforts to combat these groups and internal
criminal feuds have resulted in 150 deaths, 909 captures, and
234 arrest warrants issued. The GOC believes the new groups
are a law enforcement matter, not a national security threat,
and is targeting them aggressively. End summary.
-------------------------------------
Who are the Emerging Criminal Groups?
-------------------------------------
¶2. (C) The GOC and the Mission to Support the Peace Process
in Colombia (MAPP/OAS) estimate there are 21 new criminal
structures with roughly 3,000 members, among them common
criminals, narcotraffickers, demobilized paramilitaries, and
paramilitaries who never demobilized (ref B). Most leaders
are former mid-level paramilitary members but, on average,
demobilized paramilitaries account for less than 20 percent
of the groups' members.
¶3. (C) MAPP/OAS analysts say these groups are well-armed,
but widely dispersed. They appear to have no political
ideology, common organization or operations. They fight the
FARC and ELN in Meta and Vichada for control of illegal
activities, but, in general, do not mount the
counterinsurgency-type operations conducted by the AUC. An
exception is Narino, where OAS/MAPP head Sergio Caramagna and
local UN High Commission for Refugees representative Roberto
Maier told us members of the Organizacion Nueva Generacion
cooperate with the Colombian military to combat the FARC. On
the north coast, which was formerly controlled by
paramilitary leader Jorge 40, the FARC and ELN presence is
minimal, and the criminal groups function as an urban mafia.
¶4. (C) Institute for Development and Peace Studies
(Indepaz) Director Camilo Gonzalez confirmed to us on
February 9 that the new groups do not consider themselves
counterinsurgency forces. Their size and operations are much
smaller than the former paramilitary forces. Still,
similarities include their geographic areas of operations and
the types of illegal activities in which they engage.
Gonzalez said most group members who have died have been
killed in internal battles over control of activities, such
as narcotrafficking and extortion.
¶5. (C) Despite some of the differences between the former
AUC and the new criminal groups, the GOC's Communities at
Risk Program Director Sandra Pinzon said on February 1 that
grass roots communities suffering from the groups' criminal
activities do not distinguish between them and the AUC.
MAPP/OAS regional representatives agree, saying they have
heard complaints that some new criminal groups use AUC
emblems and other insignias, such as the Black Eagles, or
"Aguilas Negras," to instill fear. Still, the groups lack a
national network such as the AUC, and only cooperate with
each other when it advances their financial interests.
Colonel Jose Humberto Henao, who is in charge of a special
squadron to combat the groups in Norte de Santander, told us
on February 7 the national "myth" of the Aguilas Negras began
in Norte de Santander, but he has not seen a broader effort
by the group to expand its operations beyond the area.
------------
GOC Response
------------
¶6. (C) The GOC in March 2006 created an interagency group to
coordinate efforts against the new groups (ref C). Director
for Rural Security Police ("Carabineros") General Jesus A.
Gomez Mendez directs this effort and told us on February 9
GOC actions to date have led to 150 deaths, 909 captures, and
234 arrest warrants issued. The GOC has also identified a
further 459 members. Of the 30 criminal groups discovered so
far, the GOC has forced nine to disband, captured seven
ringleaders or financiers, and killed two more. In addition,
five leaders or financiers were murdered by their own people.
Of the 909 members captured, all remain under arrest. Some
166, or 18.3 percent, are demobilized paramilitaries.
¶7. (C) Gomez Mendez said the GOC's strategy to combat the
groups involves: (1) collection of information; (2)
verification and exchange of information; (3) execution of
operations; and (4) legal investigation and prosecution. He
is creating special squadrons to combat the new groups, and
is boosting the number of police substations and personnel in
areas most at risk. The first squadron was created in Norte
de Santander early this year, and consists of Police, Armed
Forces, Fiscalia, Department of Administrative Security
(DAS), and Public Ministry officials. It delivered its first
results in January with the discovery of a sizeable
drug-processing laboratory belonging to an emerging criminal
group in Los Patios, Norte de Santander. The CNP has also
opened 15 new substations in vulnerable areas of Narino,
Norte de Santander, Choco, Putumayo, Vichada, Casanare,
Cordoba, and Cesar, manned by an average of 40 officers.
Gomez Mendez said MAPP/OAS plans to monitor the 107
Carabinero Stations opened in areas with large demobilized
populations. Police Intelligence analysts told us February 5
they are planning joint operations with the Finance Ministry
to target the new groups' finances.
--------------------
Remaining Challenges
--------------------
¶8. (C) Gomez Mendez highlighted the three challenges to
fully dismantle these structures: topography, infiltration,
and money. First, most key leaders are hiding in rural areas
or hard-to-reach places. Second, they have "collaborators
and infiltrators" in their areas of operations and in GOC
institutions that tip them off if there is an operation
underway. XXXXXXXXXXXX Intel officer XXXXXXXXXXXX
estimated that almost 250 of the approximately 330-340
members of new criminal groups operating in Uraba had prior
military experience. These ex-military often receive advance
notice of operations from their former colleagues. Lastly,
there is "lots of money" in the business, which allows the
groups to be well-armed and to corrupt public institutions,
making it hard for the State to compete. Despite their
growth, General Gomez Mendez does not believe the new groups
will become a national threat if current GOC efforts against
them continue.
¶9. (C) In contrast, MAPP/OAS and Indepaz analysts warned it
would be hard to fully dismantle the groups because of their
"mafia-like structures," including extensive informant and
drug processing/distribution networks. MAPP/OAS Analytical
Unit Coordinator Juan Carlos Garzon explained these groups
could recover more easily than the FARC or ELN from GOC
military actions because they do not need much leadership or
social base. MAPP/OAS and Indepaz regional representatives
say the groups are rebuilding criminal networks previously
run by the AUC.
¶10. (C) In some regions, residents complain criminal group
members still assist the Public Forces. Former paramilitary
leaders Macaco, El Aleman and Jorge 40 told MAPP/OAS
officials there was an agreement with the GOC that their
informant networks would be incorporated into the military's
"red de cooperantes" program. DAS Director Andres Penate
denied this. He said during the GOC-AUC negotiations, the
GOC rejected an AUC proposal that some of its members be
authorized to carry arms for self-defense. Instead, the GOC
agreed to set up "red de cooperantes" networks--from which
ex-paramilitaries were excluded--in areas where large numbers
of demobilized settled. Still, XXXXXXXXXXXX intel
officer XXXXXXXXXXXX told us he has incorporated former members of
El Aleman's Elmer Cardenas block--with the approval of GOC
civilian authorities--into his red de cooperantes. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said the former paramilitaries are providing good information
on a new criminal group in Uraba associated with
ex-paramilitary leader Vicente Castano.
¶11. (C) Former paramilitary leaders Salvatore Mancuso and
Carlos Mario Jimenez (AKA "Macaco") said paramilitary leaders
who refused to demobilize were behind the creation of new
paramilitary groups and 5,000 of the 31,000 paramilitaries
who demobilized are rearming. Indepaz analysts noted
Mancuso's and Macaco's comments were self-serving as they are
seeking more benefits from the Justice and Peace Law process.
Many observers agree that paramilitary leaders who refused
to turn themselves in, such as Vicente Castano, "HH,"
"Cuchillo," and "Los Mellizos," are behind many of the new
groups. OAS's Garzon doubted the ex-paramilitary leaders,
who turned themselves in, involvement because could negate
their favorable benefits under the Justice and Peace Law and
they could be extradited.
DRUCKER