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Viewing cable 07LIMA2129, REFORM WITHOUT REVOLUTION: THE VIEW FROM PUNO
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07LIMA2129 | 2007-06-19 17:05 | 2011-02-25 12:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Lima |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #2129/01 1701712
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191712Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5894
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 1681
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4772
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7409
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0477
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN MONTEVIDEO 9201
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1284
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1330
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS LIMA 002129
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
USEU PASS TO MCKINLEY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CU PE PGOV PINR PTER SNAR VE
SUBJECT: REFORM WITHOUT REVOLUTION: THE VIEW FROM PUNO
REF: A. LIMA 1841
¶B. LIMA 2000
¶C. LIMA 2...
id: 112682
date: 6/19/2007 17:12
refid: 07LIMA2129
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07LIMA1841
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #2129/01 1701712
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191712Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5894
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 1681
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4772
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7409
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0477
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN MONTEVIDEO 9201
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1284
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1330
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
----------------- header ends ----------------
UNCLAS LIMA 002129
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
USEU PASS TO MCKINLEY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CU PE PGOV PINR PTER SNAR VE
SUBJECT: REFORM WITHOUT REVOLUTION: THE VIEW FROM PUNO
REF: A. LIMA 1841
¶B. LIMA 2000
¶C. LIMA 2009
¶D. LIMA 2026
Sensitive But Unclassified, Please Handle Accordingly.
¶1. (SBU) Comment: Despite grinding poverty, bumbling local
government, and flaring racial animosities, revolutionary
political action in the altiplano department of Puno is
unlikely, even though Puno is an historic center of Peruvian
radicalism. Regional officials describe themselves as
pragmatic leftists in desperate need of funds to build
schools, roads, and medical clinics. The opposition, NGOs,
the press, and political analysts say the real issue is
competence, not money or ideology, with an inept and
increasingly unpopular regional president, Hernan Fuentes,
attacking opponents in an attempt to hold on to office.
Enough smoke exists to suggest Venezuelan agents are trying
to exploit the unrest, but in Puno, as in much of Peru,
long-standing local grievances predate Venezuelan meddling.
The example of Puno suggests Bolivarian propaganda carries
little weight for dissatisfied citizens seeking tangible
benefits from local governments. In spite of the glaring
failures of democratic representatives to deliver services,
most citizens of Puno are seeking reform, not revolution.
End Comment
--------------------
The Problems in Puno
--------------------
¶2. (SBU) The southern highland province of Puno, with a
regional capital of the same name, has long been one of
Peru's most isolated and singular areas, noted for fiercely
independent Aymara communities in the south, wide-open
smuggling across the long border with Bolivia, and an
affinity for far-left radicalism. The region is 80 per cent
indigenous. Regional president Hernan Fuentes of the Advanza
Pais party won elections in November 2006, with the smallest
plurality of any candidate in the country -- 20 per cent of
the popular vote; runner-up Jose Bautista received 19 per
cent.
¶3. (SBU) Fuentes told poloff June 7 that his government is
pragmatic, not ideological, and would accept help from anyone
who offered it. In his words, "If the United States would
give me money, I would be a capitalist." Fuentes added that
the number one issue facing the government was unsafe and
poorly maintained roads -- trips of less than 300 kilometers
can take as long as 24 hours -- and he lambasted the Garcia
administration for ignoring the province and for failing to
provide the funds necessary to repair crumbling
infrastructure. He also criticized NGOs, who he said "have
not completed one public work in the last 20 years." Fuentes
plans to convoke NGOs to obtain a clear accounting of how
they have spent funds, and he is looking into the possibility
of requiring international donors to give aid directly to the
regional government.
¶4. (SBU) The Director General of education in Puno, Saul
Bermejo, described the quality of public education in Puno as
"dismal." Many classes are held in condemned buildings that
pose a safety threat to schoolchildren. Eighty-six percent
of students are unable to perform at the appropriate grade
level, and no bi-lingual programs exist, even though most
children entering school do not speak Spanish. Local schools
follow a curriculum dictated by the central government, which
emphasizes memorization of literary classics, a pedagogy that
Bermejo says fails to interest the children of poor farmers.
Bermejo noted that 40 per cent of public school children in
Puno's sister city of Juliaca attend private schools, a clear
repudiation of the provincial public school system.
¶5. (SBU) The director of the Bolivarian Alternative for
Latin America (ALBA) center, Maricail Maydana, and the
regional director for decentralization, Cesar Esquivel,
complained that 70 percent of Puno's citizens live in
poverty, but the central government fails to provide the
funding needed to offer adequate health care. Maydana said
the regional government, in desperation, had turned to
Venezuela for help, and Venezuela had responded by
subsidizing medical treatment for Puno residents in the
nearby town of Copacabana, Bolivia. Esquivel emphasized that
Venezuela offered pragmatic not ideological support, and he
said the regional government was socialist only in the sense
that it sought a fairer distribution of resources. Esquivel
said Fuentes was a leftist, but a "Puno leftist," who would
create a from of government independent of the model offered
by either Venezuela or Cuba.
------------------------
Politics without Results
------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Fuentes' critics -- and they are many -- have
complained that the problem in Puno is not lack of money but
Fuentes' inability to govern. After six months in power, the
government has spent less than one percent of the annual
funds earmarked for public works and has yet to announce
plans for social development. The only jobs filled in the
regional government have gone to eight members of Fuentes'
immediate family, including his sister and uncle. Fuentes
has clashed openly and repeatedly with the provincial
assembly over plans to reduce municipal salaries, and
relations have deteriorated to the point that the
administration and regional legislature no longer meet
regularly.
¶7. (SBU) NGOs and members of the press say there is a darker
side to Fuentes' incompetence. They allege that Fuentes has
organized local thugs to intimidate political opponents and
has threatened to dissolve the regional assembly. Fuentes'
complaints about NGOs, they say, represent a thinly-disguised
attempt to muzzle civil society and to divert international
aid to governmental coffers. Javier Torres of the NGO
Servicios Educativo Regales says Fuentes is also a racist.
In the November 2006 elections, he made overt appeals to
Quechan nationalism to counter the Aymara-supported campaign
of Bautista. Torres says Fuentes is heavily influenced by
the "ethnocacerism" of Antauro Humala, a murky philosophy
that seeks to return Peru to a past when only indigenous
persons wielded political power (reftels A and C).
-------------------
The Aymara Response
-------------------
¶8. (SBU) Fuentes' direct appeals for Quechua support have not
gone over well in Aymara-speaking regions of southern Puno,
which contain the majority of the population. (These regions
split their vote in the 2006 elections, allowing Fuentes to
win.) In mid-May the Aymara mayors of four districts in the
south formed the Union of Municipalities (UMA), a political
party seeking greater social development in local villages
and advocating closer ties with Aymara communities in
northern Bolivia. According to Woodrow Andia, the director
of CARE in Puno, this kind of Aymara nationalism flares
periodically in Puno when social tensions rise. Andia says
Felipe Quispe, an Aymara leader from Bolivia with ties to
terrorism, makes periodic trips to UMA areas to try to win
support.
---------------------------
Where is the Bolivarianism?
---------------------------
¶9. (SBU) Javier Molina of the NGO Peru Network in Puno says
Venezuelan operatives have approached UMA representatives
with offers of support (Molina has no direct evidence of
this, but has heard it is the case). Molina insists the
Venezuelans have met a cold reception, because the Aymaras
seek social development in geographically limited areas and
are uninterested in socialism or in larger questions of
international politics. Fuentes' close association with
Caracas, moreover, has discredited Venezuela in the eyes of
many Aymara leaders.
¶10. (SBU) Political analysts and reporters estimate that less
than 25 percent of voters are sympathetic to Bolivarianism,
and analysts note that the ruling APRA party pulled 16
percent of the vote in provincial elections. (Evo Morales is
widely popular, but he is admired for his poor, indigenous
background, not for his political views.) Andia calls the
regional government's calls for socialism and public embrace
of Venezuelan diplomats a "marketing ploy" designed to draw
attention away from Fuentes' inability to get anything done.
Political analyst Percy Medina says that Puno is a
traditional stronghold of radicalism, but a radicalism that
lacks ideological content and represents a repudiation of all
things Lima. According to Medina, Ollanta Humala won
widespread support in the 2006 presidential elections by
portraying himself as the anti-establishment candidate, but
one year later, his support has dropped to less than 10 per
cent of the population, because Puno residents doubt his
radical nationalism can improve their lives.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Comment: Decentralization, Venezuela, and Democracy
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶11. (SBU) A politically clumsy regional president lacking
the technical skills to run government presents hard choices
for the ambitious decentralization plans of President Garcia
(reftel D). If Garcia sends funds to Puno, the money may be
wasted or strengthen a regional president with a lukewarm
commitment to democracy. If Puno is starved of funds, social
discontent could find outlet in one of the many forms of
radicalism present in Puno. For now, most residents blame
Fuentes for doing nothing to fix bad schools and bad roads,
but if provincial inaction continues, the smoldering distrust
and resentment that exists towards local government is likely
to be redirected towards Lima. Former president Alberto
Fujimori won over the province by funding social development
directly from Lima, bypassing local officials, an
anti-democratic option unavailable to Garcia.
¶12. (SBU) The widespread media coverage in Lima of the
Bolivarian threat in Puno (reftel B) shows the danger of
viewing all conflict through the lens of Venezuelan
agitation. Many in Puno say Venezuelan diplomats are handing
over cash to campesino leaders in the countryside to foment
protests -- though hard facts are missing -- but the
ubiquitous poverty of the region provides sufficient reason
for unrest without Venezuelan meddling. Puno's long history
of smuggling makes most residents practical opportunists
uninterested in ideology. Campesinos will take Venezuelan
money, but it is doubtful that cash will buy long-term
support or allow Bolivarianism to gain ascendance in the
swirling currents of Puno radicalism.
¶13. (SBU) Finally, in spite of a regional government on the
verge of failure six months into a five year term, the anger
in Puno remains focused on holding local officials
accountable for substandard services, not on a desire for
revolutionary change. Few want to return to the turmoil that
marked the 10-year struggle against terrorism, and the demand
for social and political transformation voiced by Bolivarian,
communist, nationalist, and ethnocacerist leaders in Puno is
not shared by the general populace. Fuentes is likely to
face mounting protests in the coming months, but protests
that focus on the need to find more doctros and teachers.
Radicals are popular because the central government is often
seen as indifferent to local needs, but even radicals, at
some point, will have to make sure the trains run on time.
STRUBLE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================