Currently released so far... 5415 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AE
AJ
ASEC
AMGT
AR
AU
AG
AS
AM
AORC
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
AGMT
CH
CASC
CA
CD
CV
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CU
CBW
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CDG
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
EPET
EINV
ECON
ENRG
EAID
ETRD
EG
ETTC
EFIN
EU
EAGR
ELAB
EIND
EUN
EAIR
ER
ECIN
ECPS
EFIS
EI
EINT
EZ
EMIN
ET
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ES
ECA
ELN
EN
EFTA
EWWT
ELTN
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ENVI
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INTERPOL
IPR
IN
INRB
IAEA
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IV
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KZ
KDEM
KN
KNNP
KPAL
KU
KWBG
KCRM
KE
KISL
KAWK
KSCA
KS
KSPR
KJUS
KFRD
KTIP
KPAO
KTFN
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KGHG
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KDRG
KIRF
KIRC
KBIO
KHLS
KG
KACT
KGIC
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMC
KTLA
KCFC
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MTCRE
MX
MCAP
MO
MNUC
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
ODIP
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OEXC
OPRC
OFDP
OPDC
OTRA
OSCE
OAS
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PINR
PREL
PTER
PK
PHUM
PE
PARM
PBIO
PINS
PREF
PSOE
PBTS
PL
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PROP
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
POGOV
PINL
SCUL
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SU
SW
SOCI
SL
SG
SMIG
SO
SF
SR
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
SNARCS
STEINBERG
TX
TW
TU
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TS
TBIO
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UG
UP
UV
US
UN
UNSC
UNGA
USEU
USUN
UY
UZ
UNO
UNMIK
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07PARIS3237, FRENCH MFA PUTS SARKOZY'S JULY 10-11 NORTH AFRICA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07PARIS3237.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07PARIS3237 | 2007-07-31 14:02 | 2011-02-21 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/170211/tunisie-wikileaks-portrait-dune-diplomatie-francaise-soumise-au-regime- |
VZCZCXRO6992
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #3237/01 2121431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311431Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9233
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 003237
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER PBTS ETRD FR AG TU MO
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA PUTS SARKOZY'S JULY 10-11 NORTH AFRICA
TRIP IN CONTEXT
REF: A. (A) TUNIS 949
¶B. (B) ALGIERS 1004
¶C. (C) RABAT 1128
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, for reas
ons 1.4. (b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: President Sarkozy's first visit outside
Europe July 10-11 to Algeria and Tunisia underscored his
determination to proceed with his still vague Mediterranean
Union initiative, establish his own relationships with the
leaders in those countries, and pave the way for state visits
in 2007 and 2008. Neither stop yielded much in the way of
""deliverables."" This was most apparent in Algeria, where
images of Bouteflika's warm reception reportedly contrasted
with disagreements over Sarkozy's refusal to atone publicly
for the sins of France's colonial rule. Both sides agreed to
suspend further work on a treaty of friendship started under
President Chirac. An agreement on diplomatic visas
contrasted with disappointment over a bilateral accord on
civilian nuclear development and a lukewarm reception to the
Mediterranean Union idea. In Tunisia, Sarkozy dealt with the
sensitive issue of human rights himself in private meetings
and limited press statements even at the risk of sending a
mixed message in terms of his break with his more tolerant
predecessor. Tunisian leaders voiced greater enthusiasm for
the Mediterranean Union, which, according to our MFA
interlocutors, reflects profound unhappiness over the
Barcelona Process. The GOF was unhappy about Morocco's
last-minute cancellation of what would have been the third
leg of the North African tour but plans to proceed with a
state visit there in October. End summary
¶2. (C) We spoke recently to the French MFA's Algeria and
Tunisia/Libya desk officers about President Sarkozy's July
10-11 visits. As noted in refs A and B, the visit was more
of a symbolic opportunity to get to know the respective
leaders and lay down some preliminary markers for formal
state visits to follow in late 2007 and possibly early 2008.
The much ballyhooed but little understood Mediterranean Union
idea also featured in the discussions both to ensure the
leaders had some conception of the proposal as well as
understood Sarkozy's personal commitment to implementing his
still inchoate vision of what France hopes will be an
important regional grouping.
Algeria: Forget the Past -- Please
-----------------------------------
¶3. (C) Algeria desk officer Jay Dharmadhikari provided an
elaborate overview of the framework in which France places
its bilateral relationship with Algeria, stressing how it is
divided into consular (especially visas), security,
economic/commercial, and political dossiers. In the context
of the visit, however, he stressed that Presidents Sarkozy
and Bouteflika got into little detail and did not accomplish
a great deal in terms of concrete deliverables.
--Visas: As noted in ref B, Paris eased visa restrictions
for diplomatic passport holders but insisted on holding the
line for everyone else (including ""service"" passport holders
who include military and security as well as other government
personnel). France has very little leeway, he explained,
vis-a-vis the other Schengen partners, which always rankles
the Algerians. The most France could do was promise to
""study"" the matter further.
--France's colonial legacy/treaty of friendship: An
essential point in Sarkozy's visit to Algiers was repeating
as president his contention that France and Algeria needed to
put the past behind them as much as possible. This meant no
French ""repentance"" for past sins dating back to the colonial
period. Dharmadhikari underscored that Bouteflika and other
Algerians expressed their view that France should not expect
to wipe the slate clean and move on. Although French media
made much of the reputed ""burial"" of what became in Chirac's
last two years a controversial draft friendship treaty
between France and Algeria, Dharmadhikari said only that the
treaty is on indefinite hold and could be revived later
should conditions warrant. (Comment: We note that Sarkozy's
""no repentance"" line resurfaced in a speech he gave in Dakar
July 26 that, inter alia, urged all Africans to look beyond
their sense of grievance over the colonial past and focus on
the real problems that confront them today. End comment)
--Economic/commercial ties: One of France's longstanding
priorities with Algeria, according to Dharmadhikari, is
promoting commercial and investment ties. He complained,
however, that French businesses continue to have problems
with bureaucratic red tape and other institutional and
non-institutional barriers to conducting business. Reform,
PARIS 00003237 002 OF 003
especially where it applies to reviewing and revising
protectionist regulations and retooling inadequate judicial
mechanisms for dispute resolution, remains a slow and
uncertain process. When asked how much assistance France
provides to help Algeria in these and related fields (such as
assistance for WTO accession), Dharmadhikari demurred,
indicating that virtually all French assistance flows through
the EU so that aid is delivered multilaterally.
--Civilian nuclear development: Dharmadhikari acknowledged
that France did not get very far pushing its desire to sell
civilian nuclear equipment to Algeria on this trip. He
faulted inadequate preparation for the visit (presumably on
the Algerian side) more than Algerian disinterest in the
idea. Dharmadhikari noted our signature of an accord
recently with the Algerians and hoped that the USG and GOF
could consult formally about nuclear cooperation with Algeria.
--Western Sahara and Boutef's health: During the meeting
between the presidents, the emotional subject of France's
colonial legacy kept coming up along with the desire to
continue cooperating closely on security issues (primarily
terrorism). On the Western Sahara, Dharmadhikari stated that
Bouteflika complained about France's tilt in Morocco's favor
but Sarkozy refused to be drawn into a detailed discussion of
the subject and insisted the substance of French policy had
not fundamentally changed. Bouteflika seemed relatively
healthy and engaged, though not enough to alter Paris' view
that he will be lucky to survive to the end of his current
term in 2009.
--The Mediterranean Union idea, Dharmadhikari confirmed, did
not excite the Algerians. He characterized their reaction as
lukewarm but not dismissive. Dharmadhikari opined that
Algeria's reaction was based on a realistic calculation that
such a grouping made no sense and would not work as long as
Moroccan/Algerian ties were so antagonistic. Dharmadhikari
further thought that Algeria was being true to its tendency
not to favor any gathering or international initiative that
it was neither leading nor instigating.
--Reinforcing the relationship's ""political direction:"" One
positive outcome from the visit Dharmadhikari cited was
agreement by the two presidents that the intergovernmental
mechanisms handling the details of the bilateral relationship
needed to be reinforced. Specifically, the two sides agreed
that their respective prime ministers would oversee the work
of their ministries and thus give a political aspect to the
functional work they undertook. This should provide better
accountability and ensure that the state visit expected in
November truly delivers concrete results (such as an
agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation).
Tunisia: All Smiles and Some Nervousness
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Tunisia/Libya desk officer Christian Reigneaud had a
less stressful time preparing Sarkozy's visit to Tunis. The
Tunisians, he said, were warm and there were almost no
contentious issues to discuss. Human rights was the
exception, and in that sense the French delegation quickly
picked up Tunisian nervousness about how Sarkozy, as opposed
to Chirac, would deal with them. In the end, Reigneaud
explained, Sarkozy exercised discretion in confining his most
critical comments on human rights to his one-on-one with Ben
Ali. Reigneaud claimed that Sarkozy did discuss specific
cases, including the subsequently released dissident lawyer
Mohammed Abbou. (Comment: French newspapers reporting
Abbou's release referred to reports that Sarkozy had raised
his specific case while in Tunis. Interestingly, and perhaps
partly because of the overwhelming and breathless coverage of
France's role in the ""Bulgarian medics"" case and Sarkozy's
visit to Libya, the GOF did not seek credit for Abbou's
release. End comment) The general tenor of Sarkozy's
general talking points to Ben Ali, Reigneaud assured us, were
along the lines of ""we do not want to see anything threaten
Tunisia's internal stability but believe that Tunisia must be
confident enough of its economic and social strengths to open
up.""
¶5. (C/NF) When asked about the one-on-one that Sarkozy had
with Ben Ali, Reigneaud replied that it concerned problems
France has encountered in its bilateral security cooperation.
Tunisia had been upset about French security service contact
with a prominent Tunisian dissident in exile (NFI) and
believed French intelligence had provided support for his
criticisms of Ben Ali and his family from France. Sarkozy
set the record straight, and France was hoping this important
liaison relationship, focused heavily on terrorism, would get
back on track.
PARIS 00003237 003 OF 003
¶6. (C) By contrast with the Algerians, Reigneaud described
the Tunisians as ""ecstatic"" about the Mediterranean Union
concept. This reflects disappointment with the Barcelona
process, he explained, and possibly the desire to find a more
solid anchor working principally with France than the EU to
promote regional cooperation. Anything that would reduce the
scope for the Nordics and other northern Europeans to
complain about human rights was also something Tunisia
welcomed.
¶7. (C) As with Algeria, the French are looking ahead to a
yet-to-be finalized state visit in late 2007/early 2008.
Reigneaud said the well-established bilateral commissions
would start working on deliverables, and he thought Prime
Minister Fillon and/or FM Kouchner would visit in the not too
distant future.
Morocco: The Stop Not Made
---------------------------
¶8. (C) Dharmadhikari and Reigneaud confirmed the irritation
at senior levels of the GOF over Morocco's request that
Sarkozy not include Rabat in this tour. They gave all the
reasons cited in ref C, most of which have come out in the
French media. The last-minute nature of the cancellation was
more irritating than the cancellation itself, according to
our interlocutors. Dharmadhikari, who handles the Western
Sahara portfolio, said the Moroccan decision reflected the
sort of impulsive and arbitrary style the GOF has gotten used
to from King Mohammed. It would have no long-term effects on
that bilateral relationship, but it did serve as a firm
reminder of the sensitivities France has to balance between
Morocco and Algeria.
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Sarkozy's choice of the Maghreb as his first
non-European trip as president surprised many but has been
explained away by recalling that his desire to establish a
Mediterranean Union was one of the specific things Sarkozy
referred to in his statement immediately after being elected.
Even though the union still seems more of an idea Sarkozy
has been nursing for some time, and not a carefully
thought-out vision (we are still not sure where this
initiative is being handled bureaucratically in the GOF), he
clearly wanted to be seen taking the concept to those leaders
whose help he needs to bring it to life. Morocco's
last-minute cancellation, therefore, was a setback to
Sarkozy's desire to be seen moving quickly to make good on
one of his initiatives.
¶10. (C) In Algeria, the reality behind the smiles and warm
interaction between Bouteflika and Sarkozy in front of the
cameras was probably sobering but important. Sarkozy likely
appreciates how much he has to make up for in terms of the
damage done to France's ties with Algeria over the past two
years. Nevertheless, Sarkozy's determination to look to the
future and not dwell on the sins of France's colonial past
cannot have gone over well with a veteran of the Algerian
liberation struggle like Bouteflika. The state visit should
reveal whether the two leaders' generational difference over
this symbolic point translates into substantive obstacles to
the better ties both say they want. In Tunisia, Sarkozy
wanted to mark a break from the heavily personalized and much
criticized relationship Chirac had with Ben Ali. His desire
to keep the most contentious part of the bilateral
relationship away from public view, however, inadvertently
sent the wrong signal. His delegation snubbed Tunisia's
independent civil society, and his state secretary for human
rights was forced to endure ridicule in the French media for
having been invisible in Tunis and only meeting the head of a
Tunisian human rights group in Paris after the visit. Ben
Ali and his cohorts, on the other hand, were probably
relieved to have gotten off as lightly as they did and
probably hope that the schizophrenia of the later Chirac
years (Douste-Blazy reputedly despised and would not visit
Tunisia for its human rights record) will not be repeated.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
PEKALA