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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251703Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2693
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 3305
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1928
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0152
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0765
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1649
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN 5651
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5425
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1207
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 3904
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000077 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CI PE
SUBJECT: CHILEAN REACTION TO PERU'S SUBMISSION TO THE HAGUE 
ON MARITIME ISSUE 
 
REF: A. SANTIAGO 00054 
   ...
id: 138753
date: 1/25/2008 17:03
refid: 08SANTIAGO77
origin: Embassy Santiago
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08LIMA72|08SANTIAGO36|08SANTIAGO54
header:
VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #0077/01 0251703
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251703Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2693
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 3305
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1928
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0152
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0765
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1649
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN 5651
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5425
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1207
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 3904
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY


----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000077 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR WHA/BSC 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CI PE
SUBJECT: CHILEAN REACTION TO PERU'S SUBMISSION TO THE HAGUE 
ON MARITIME ISSUE 

REF: A. SANTIAGO 00054 
     ¶B. SANTIAGO 00036 
     ¶C. LIMA 00072 

Classified By: EPOL Counselor Juan A. Alsace.  Reasons: 1.4 (B and D). 

¶1. (C) Summary: The Chilean government categorically rejects 
Peru's maritime claim and has vowed to use all available 
legal resources to defeat it.  In public, the GOC is taking 
the moral high ground: it has expressed its "profound regret" 
at Peru's decision and pledged continued cooperation with 
Peru.  Privately, Chileans are livid that Peru has escalated 
the issue politically and argue that future cooperation will 
be difficult.  The Chilean government is confident in its 
legal case, but believes "anything can happen" at The Hague. 
Chileans have expressed their support for the Bachelet 
government's position and thus far the issue has not become a 
domestic political one.  End summary. 

¶2. (U) The Chilean government officially responded 
immediately to Peru's announcement that it had submitted its 
maritime dispute to The Hague along familiar lines: 

--The Chilean government profoundly regrets Peru's submission 
to The Hague, since such submission disregards existing valid 
agreements between the two countries and practice observed by 
both countries for years; 

--Peru's demands refer to areas that without question are 
under Chilean sovereignty and jurisdiction.  Chile will 
utilize all of the available legal resources to respond to 
this demand; and, 

--The Chilean government will try to ensure that relations 
with Peru continue along the lines of mutual cooperation and 
understanding. 

(Note: This official position, as reported in a statement 
issued by the Foreign Ministry on January 16, tracks closely 
with the private position outlined in a non-paper that MFA 
Director General for External Relations Carlos Portales 
delivered to U/S Burns in March 2007 during their meeting in 
Washington, D.C.  Portales gave the Ambassador a similar 
paper on January 14 - ref. A) 

¶3. (C) Publicly, Chileans across the political spectrum have 
denounced Peru's action and rallied behind the government. 
In anticipation of Peru's move, the Bachelet administration 
took several steps to build such support.  For example, it 
established a Chilean legal and diplomatic team led by 
Foreign Minister Foxley that includes Deputy FM Alberto van 
Klaveren (agent before The Hague) and several senior Chilean 
diplomats.  It also contracted several foreign legal experts. 
 To further shore up domestic support, the GOC assembled a 
group of former Chilean foreign ministers (including those 
who served during the Pinochet era) to advise the Foreign 
Ministry on the issue.  In the days leading up to Peru's 
submission, Foreign Minister Foxley met with the ex-foreign 
ministers, members of Congress, political figures, and 
leading business groups to brief on Chile's position, and to 
solicit their support.  In each meeting, Foxley specifically 
stressed the importance of maintaining a single, unified 
Chilean position and of keeping the issue in legal channels, 
according to his chief of staff, Roberto Matus.  Given that 
Chileans have been united on the issue for some time, 
obtaining consensus thus far has not been difficult.  He also 
encouraged the Chileans to make public statements supporting 
the Chilean government's position and to pledge not to use 
the issue for "political gain" in Chile as the country moves 
further into campaign season.  So far, Foxley's efforts have 
been successful.  Concertacion coalition, opposition and 
business figures have publicly backed the government and 
endorsed a single Chilean foreign policy under the leadership 
of the Foreign Ministry.  And the issue has not become a 
political one here.  But while Foreign Ministry officials are 
breathing a sigh of relief, they caution that there is a lot 
of time between now and the 2009 elections for the 
center-right opposition to use the issue for its political 

gain. 

¶4. (C) Privately, Chilean government officials are livid that 
Peru decided to "escalate the matter politically."  Senior 
officials including Chile's Ambassador to the U.S. Fernandez 
and MFA DG for External Relations Portales contend that Peru 
remains trapped in the past and unable to look to the future. 
 They argue that the Bachelet administration has gone out of 
its way to support the Garcia administration on several 
fronts, including the economic (U.S.-Peru FTA, APEC and the 
P4) and defense (resumption of two-plus-two meetings, 
confidence-building measures between militaries).  And this 
is what Chile gets in return? 

¶5. (C) For the GOC, there is no maritime border issue, since 
past agreements signed by Chile and Peru resolved the issue. 
The Chileans say their legal case is strong, but as former 
Army Chief of Staff Cheyre recently cautioned, victory is far 
from certain and "anything can happen" at The Hague. 

¶6. (C) Senior GOC officials stop short of saying that Peru's 
submission to The Hague has prompted the Chileans to cease 
cooperation.  However, they are clear that Chileans "need to 
be realistic in light of Peru's latest actions," according to 
the MFA's Portales, who noted to the Ambassador recently, "It 
is going to be very difficult for us to help Peru under these 
circumstances."  Under Secretary of War Gonzalo Garcia told 
the Ambassador on January 23 that he doubted Chile and Peru 
would hold "two-plus-two" (foreign and defense ministers) 
meetings any time soon. 

¶7. (C) Not all Chileans, however, have been supportive of 
Chile's overtures to Peru.  Prominent Chilean businessman 
Andronico Luksic, whose family businesses lost nearly 200 
million dollars in business disputes in Peru during the Lagos 
administration, questioned the Chilean government's support 
for Garcia during a recent dinner hosted by the Ambassador in 
honor of visiting USSOUTHCOM CDR Stavridis.  Luksic's main 
point -- one that is shared by many Chileans including 
Foreign Ministry careerists who have served in Lima -- is 
that Peru is unreliable and Chile should remain firm against 
it. 

¶8. (C) Comment: Peru's decision to take its dispute to The 
Hague did not surprise the Chilean government, which had 
prepared the Chilean public for such an eventuality for 
months.  FM Foxley's around-the-clock meetings, the 
appointment of a bipartisan advisory committee of ex-foreign 
ministers, and the assembly of outside legal counsel all 
point to a government that had resigned itself that Peru 
would go forward.  So far, the GOC's groundwork appears to 
have paid off domestically: Chileans across the political 
spectrum are publicly backing the government and thus far 
have refrained from using the issue for domestic political 
gain. 

¶9. (C) Strong Chilean nationalist sentiment about attempts to 
redraw borders and frustration at what it sees as Peru's 
insistence on living in the past will not go away any time 
soon.  The Chileans will not "bend over backwards" to 
cooperate with the Garcia administration.  However, once the 
dust settles, Chile's interest in a stable and economically 
sound, outward-looking Peru will prevail.  While the GOC may 
not actively seek out opportunities for cooperation, it 
likely will continue to pursue policies that can contribute 
to a positive agenda that looks to the future.  Meanwhile, 
and despite the views of some Chilean businesspeople such as 
Luksic, Chile's growing private sector linkages with Peru are 
not likely to be affected by these developments. 
SIMONS 

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