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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000574 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/DSS/ITA, INR, AF/E, S, D, P, G, R, 
DS, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:02/27/2028 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV KE
SUBJECT: KENYA: BEHIND A CALM FACADE, HARDLINERS PREPARE FOR MORE VIOLENCE 
 
Ref:  Nairobi 379 
 
Classified by Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Kenya has been tense but remarkably calm since the 
end of January, thanks in large part to the progress being made in 
the Kofi Annan-mediated peace talks and the visit of the Secretary. 
Tensions remain very high, however, and behind this calm facade lurks 
the potential for more ferocious, ethnically-motivated violence.  One 
sign is that ethnically-based forced evictions continue around 
Nairobi.  More ominous are a steady stream of rumors that hardline 
elements from both sides of the political divide are organizing for 
more violence should the peace talks fail.  The pivot will thus be 
the outcome of the peace talks.  If a compromise is reached on power 
sharing that is seen as fair by all sides, support for organized 
violence is likely to ebb away.  If not, however, then Kenya could 
see a wave of violence far worse than the unrest seen in January 
following the disputed election.  End Summary. 
 
---------------- 
A Deceptive Calm 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Kenya has remained tense but remarkably calm throughout the 
month of February.  In late January, the country was shocked by 
violent, ethnically-motivated clashes in the tourist towns of Nakuru 
and Naivaisha, both not far from Nairobi.  This was followed by the 
back-to-back murders of two opposition Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM) parliamentarians on January 29 and January 31 (reftel), which 
led to a brief spasm of unrest in Kericho in western Kenya.  In 
short, at the end of January, the country appeared teetering on the 
edge of all-out anarchy and sustained civil unrest and disobedience. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Since then, however, Kenya has generally enjoyed an 
interlude of relative calm, in large part due to the progress made 
each week in the Kofi Annan-mediated peace talks, which has led both 
political camps to call for an end to violence.  U.S. support for the 
talks, including through the Secretary's visit, has also helped 
reassure Kenyans.  The current perception that the country's 
politicians are taking steps towards an agreement on power sharing, 
which could pave the way for political reconciliation and a return to 
normalcy, has since continued to keep tensions and violence at bay. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Forced Evictions Keep Nairobi On Edge 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The current state of relative calm, however, should not be 
interpreted as a return to sustained peace and normalcy.  In fact, 
the opposite may be true.  Throughout February, there has been a 
stream of anecdotal evidence and reporting indicating that 
ethnically-motivated forced evictions continue to occur around the 
country, including parts of Nairobi.  While it is often difficult to 
conclusively confirm what is happening, it appears that in Nairobi, 
Kikuyu youth gangs, probably incited and funded by hardline Kikuyu 
politicians and businessmen, are taking revenge for the violent 
"ethnic cleansing" of their Kikuyu breathren in January in western 
Kenya by rival Luo, Kalenjin, and other groups.   In early February, 
there was a spate of media and first-hand reports, including from 
U.S. Mission staff members, that Kikuyu gangs were marking the doors 
of non-Kikuyu residents in the Kilimani, Eastlands, and Kibera areas 
of Nairob in an attempt to intimidate them into leaving.  In the 
largely Kikuyu, rough-and-tumble area of Banana Hill on the city's 
northwestern edge, leaflets were allegedly circulating threatening 
non-Kikuyus with beheading if they did not leave.  There were also 
many reports of Kikuyu landlords being threatened with violence if 
they did not summarily evict their non-Kikuyu tenants. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Militias: Preparing for Battle? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) More ominous than forced evictions are daily rumors about the 
formation and arming of ethnic-based militias in different parts of 
the country.  It remains very difficult to confirm rumors that 
militias are being organized, but where there is so much smoke, there 
is likely to be fire, and the logic behind this phenomenon is 
compelling: Should the Kofi Annan-mediated peace talks fail, all 
sides want to be ready for the violent aftermath.  Perhaps one of the 
 
NAIROBI 00000574  002 OF 004 
 
 
most difficult puzzles to solve is the extent to which such militias 
are truly militias, characterized by a discernable chain of command 
and requisite weaponry and training, versus mere youth gangs 
organized and bussed to a site on an ad hoc basis to engage in 
violence when it is in the interest of hardline leaders to have them 
do so.  In either event, however, the results are violent and 
difficult to control. 
 
------------------------------- 
Kalenjins: Arming to the Teeth? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The most persistent stories about militias have the Kalenjin 
community in Rift Valley Province as the best organized and most 
war-like.  Conventional wisdom explains this as due in part to the 
Kalenjins' strong warrior/cattle rustling cultural tradition, but 
also to the fact that under the regime of Danial arap Moi, Kalenjins 
filled out the ranks of the Kenyan military in disproportionately 
high numbers, including in the officer corps.  As many as 25-30 
senior Kalenjin officers lost their positions after the 2002 election 
of Mwai Kibaki, adding fuel to broader, longstanding grievances among 
the Kalenjin over unfair land allocations and economic and political 
marginalization at the hands of the Kikuyu. 
 
¶7. (S) The combination of these grievances and the fact that many 
Kalenjins have military training and experience has created a 
potential scenario: That of a highly motivated and highly effective 
para-military force that could make Rift Valley Province ungovernable 
if the peace talks fail.  While the Embassy is unable to fully 
confirm these reports at this time, Kalenjin militias are purportedly 
organizing under the leadership of retired Kalenjin General John 
Koech, and are arming themselves to the teeth, according to some 
contacts.  (Note: Another contact, however, indicates Kikuyu 
politicians are attempting to link Koech to Rift Valley violence, but 
that he is in fact clean.  His role thus remains unclear.  End note). 
 A local contact reports that the Kalinjin forces are in firm 
alliance with the self proclaimed Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF), a 
clan-based militia in the Mt. Elgon region of western Kenya 
established to defend ethnic Sabaots in land disputes that pre-date 
the post-electoral unrest.  Indeed, there has been an increase in 
attacks, including cattle rustling and rape, by the SLDF in the Mount 
Elgon and Trans Nzoia areas on the homes of Kikuyu settlers.  The 
SLDF has historically been well armed, and is reportedly well-versed 
in obtaining weapons via Uganda. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Kikuyus Not Afraid to Strike Back 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) On the other side, Kikuyu vigilantes are also organizing to 
defend against attacks or carry out revenge attacks on ethnic rivals. 
 Many attribute Kikuyu-led violence to the Mungiki, a 
well-established Kikuyu criminal organization/religious sect with 
deep roots in Kenyan history.  However, after engaging in a violent 
crime spree last year well before (and unrelated to) the elections, 
the Kenyan policy cracked down on the group, reportedly fracturing 
its leadership.  It is thus unclear whether the Mungiki have in fact 
been re-energized and are behind some of the current tensions, or 
whether newer groups have formed and ordinary Kenyans simply can't 
tell the difference.  It's likely both scenarios are playing out, as 
the current environment is providing the perfect context for the 
rejuvenation of the Mungiki, as well as for the formation of new 
groups catering to the large numbers of unemployed, disaffected 
Kikuyu youth in Nairobi and elsewhere. 
 
¶9.  (S)  According to an Embassy source, elements of the 
Kikuyu-dominated Party of National Unity (PNU) are backing the 
so-called "Forest Guard" militia, which includes Mungiki members and 
is being organized and led by retired General H.W. Njoroge, former 
Commandant of the National Defense College.  Njoroge has reportedly 
put pressure on current Kenya Army Commander, Lieutenant General 
Augustino Njoroge (no known relation) to release G3 rifles and 
provide helicopter support to the Forest Guard.  H.W. Njoroge is 
allegedly being assisted by retired Brigadier General Peter Ikenya, 
who is acting as Chief of Staff for the effort.  This movement is 
reportedly receiving funding from a number of Kikuyu businessmen, 
including a Solomon Karanja and Steven Mbugwa.  Mbugwa is said to be 
running fund raising and other financial support operations out of 
his business Muthaiga, Nairobi. 
 
 
NAIROBI 00000574  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Finally, in the Coast Province, as in Rift, there is a 
tradition of youth organizing "in defense" of their communities.  The 
Provincial Security Committee in Coast, acting on information that 
youths in the South Coast were being armed and trained "in readiness 
for war", held a meeting two weeks ago with the local elders in an 
attempt to dissuade the youth from continuing this preparation. 
Should other areas explode if current negotiations fail, the 
currently quiet province, popular with tourists, may see more 
turbulent times. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Police Transfers and Live Bullets 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) In a related development, tensions are running high in the 
lakeside city of Kisumu in western Nyanza Province, around which much 
of the immediate post-electoral violence was centered.  The Kenya 
Police Service (KPS) recently transferred 200 Luo and Luyhia officers 
from Nyanza Province, an ethnic Luo stronghold.  KPS publicly stated 
that the transfers were routine, but police sources have since 
reported that the Provincial Police Officer (PPO) for Nyanza is on 
record as claiming that those being transferred were responsible for 
leaking police operational details to the opposition based on their 
Luo affiliation.  The PPO also reportedly ordered his Officers in 
Charge to ensure the transfers took place no later than 22 February. 
 
¶12. (C) On top of this came news last week from police sources that 
the PPO issued a stunning directive to his Station Commanders telling 
them that during any future political protests in the region, deadly 
force is immediately authorized.  He further assured the officers 
that any query as to the nature of the death or injury resulting from 
this order should be directed to him personally and that he would 
support the "victimized" officers. 
 
¶13. (C) Subsequently, an Embassy FSN Investigator based in Kisumu 
reported that a consignment of live ammunition, allegedly received 
from Israel, had recently been received in Kisumu, and that 30 Kenyan 
Army troops had arrived in the city on February 21, to be joined 
within days by an additional 100 KPS/General Service Unit (GSU) 
personnel.  These movements could be seen as prudent reinforcement on 
the part of the Kenyan Government, as KPS was unable to control the 
violence that erupted after the elections in early January.  On the 
other hand, it could be an indication that the government does not 
expect the peace talks to succeed and is readying for a violent 
crackdown in that event.  In response to the order to use live 
ammunition, the Ambassador wrote February 22 to Police Commissioner 
Ali to express U.S. concern about any such change in the rules of 
engagement for police in dealing with unrest.  Text of this letter 
follows below in para 16. 
 
---------------------------- 
Crime: Waiting for an Uptick 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Finally, in light of the distraction and stress on the 
police caused by ongoing political tensions, there is a real risk 
that there will be an uptick in ordinary crime in Kenya in the coming 
weeks and months.  Even if a political agreement is reached, those 
now ready to engage in political and ethnic violence may turn their 
weaponry and attention to common crime instead as a new livelihood. 
The armed carjacking on February 15 in broad daylight of a U.S. 
Mission employee a short distance from the Embassy (the employee was 
robbed but released unharmed) served to remind that Kenya is rated 
"critical" for crime for a good reason. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Comment: Peace Deal Holds theKey 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) Behind the current quiet facade, there is trouble lurking in 
the shadows.  Whether the genie of ethnic-based violence can be put 
back in the bottle or not clearly hinges on the outcome of the Kofi 
Annan-led peace talks, now at a pivotal moment.  If a compromise is 
reached that is agreeable to the two sides and most of their 
followers, then we believe much of the impetus and support for 
organized violence will fade away.  If not, however, then we should 
brace for a fresh round of violence that could dwarf January's unrest 
in its scope and ferocity. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Text of February 22 letter from the Ambassador to Police 
 
NAIROBI 00000574  004 OF 004 
 
 
Commissioner Ali follows below: 
 
Dear Commissioner Ali: 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to first commend you and the 
vast majority of police professionals in the Kenya Police Service 
(KPS) for your efforts over the past few months in maintaining law 
and order during this most trying time in Kenya's history.  I have 
been encouraged by the numerous reports received of KPS leadership 
effectively and peacefully engaging large gatherings, resulting in no 
injuries to the populace at the hands of authorities or the public. 
I also applaud all efforts to investigate and hold accountable all 
persons involved in inciting violence during this time, whether 
civilian or civil servant. 
 
However, we have recently become aware that certain officers in 
charge have directed personnel under their command that "the 
immediate use of deadly force is authorized to quell any and all new 
political protests".  Obviously, reports of this nature are both 
alarming and contrary to established rules of engagement and, in the 
spirit of true cooperation, I feel compelled to bring this to your 
immediate attention, as we have enjoyed a tremendous partnership 
across an array of law enforcement and security issues. 
Consequently, we believe that the established rules of engagement and 
situation-specific circumstances should continue to dictate the 
minimal use of deadly force. 
 
We trust that you will continue to address this issue with the 
urgency and importance it merits. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
End text. 
Ranneberger