Currently released so far... 5415 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AE
AJ
ASEC
AMGT
AR
AU
AG
AS
AM
AORC
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
AGMT
CH
CASC
CA
CD
CV
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CU
CBW
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CDG
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
EPET
EINV
ECON
ENRG
EAID
ETRD
EG
ETTC
EFIN
EU
EAGR
ELAB
EIND
EUN
EAIR
ER
ECIN
ECPS
EFIS
EI
EINT
EZ
EMIN
ET
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ES
ECA
ELN
EN
EFTA
EWWT
ELTN
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ENVI
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INTERPOL
IPR
IN
INRB
IAEA
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IV
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KZ
KDEM
KN
KNNP
KPAL
KU
KWBG
KCRM
KE
KISL
KAWK
KSCA
KS
KSPR
KJUS
KFRD
KTIP
KPAO
KTFN
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KGHG
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KDRG
KIRF
KIRC
KBIO
KHLS
KG
KACT
KGIC
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMC
KTLA
KCFC
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MTCRE
MX
MCAP
MO
MNUC
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
ODIP
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OEXC
OPRC
OFDP
OPDC
OTRA
OSCE
OAS
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PINR
PREL
PTER
PK
PHUM
PE
PARM
PBIO
PINS
PREF
PSOE
PBTS
PL
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PROP
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
POGOV
PINL
SCUL
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SU
SW
SOCI
SL
SG
SMIG
SO
SF
SR
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
SNARCS
STEINBERG
TX
TW
TU
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TS
TBIO
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UG
UP
UV
US
UN
UNSC
UNGA
USEU
USUN
UY
UZ
UNO
UNMIK
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SANTIAGO137, HOW CHILE'S RIGHT SEES THE PRESIDENTIAL
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANTIAGO137.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SANTIAGO137 | 2009-02-17 19:07 | 2011-02-11 22:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Santiago |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSG #0137/01 0481936
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171936Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4441
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 3771
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0683
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 1286
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB 6086
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5959
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 4226
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2151
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000137
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, INR, INR/B
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV ECON CI
SUBJECT: HOW CHILE'S RIGHT SEES THE PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES: THE OLD GUARD VS. THE TYCOON
REF: A. SANTIAGO 126
¶B. SANTIAGO 70
¶C. SANTIAGO 106
Classified By: Political Officer Jennifer Spande for reason 1.4 (b).
¶1. (C) Summary: Conservative political leaders and analysts see both their own presidential candidate, Sebastian Pinera, and the rival Concertacion candidate, Eduardo Frei, as ho-hum choices who are unlikely to arouse much voter enthusiasm. Frei benefited greatly from his father's legacy when he was first elected president by a wide margin in 1994, but must now stand on the strength of his own mixed record as president. Pinera's business success could help him: voters give him high marks for his ability to manage the economy. However, the Concertacion is trying to paint him as one of the greedy tycoons at fault for the financial crisis. And at least one influential conservative politician worries about Pinera's reputation as a ""jerk"" who flouts the rules. End Summary.
No More Coattails: How Alianza Views Frei
-------------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Alianza leaders are excited to be facing someone they perceive as a weaker Concertacion candidate than in years past, and believe that they now have their best shot ever at gaining the presidency. At first glance, Frei--a senator, former president, and heir to a political dynasty--seems to be a formidable opponent. In the 1993 presidential election, Frei defeated independent Arturo Alessandri and other minor contenders with 58 per cent of the vote--the highest vote a presidential candidate has received since Chile's return to democracy. However, conservatives believe that this strong showing in the past is not a good indicator of Frei's strength today. In 1993, Frei was running largely on his father's strong record as a president and statesman. In this year's election, however, Frei will have to run on his own merits.
¶3. (C) Frei's six-year presidential term (1994-2000) left a mixed legacy in the minds of many. He was relatively popular early on, and is remembered for successful educational reform, several trade agreements, strong economic growth, state modernization, penal reform, and dealing with Pinochet's arrest in London. However, many believe that he mismanaged the impact of the Asian financial crisis on Chile in his last two years. By the end of his time in office, his approval rating had dipped to just 28 per cent. Today, Frei is seen as representing the old guard and the stale Concertacion coalition, and does not have a compelling personal history (like President Bachelet's) to overcome this perception.
¶4. (SBU) While Frei certainly has a strong core of support among Concertacion partisans, Alianza leaders believe that he is deeply unpopular with other groups. Frei has the highest rejection ratings of any candidate, Rodrigo Yanez, an analyst with conservative think tank Instituto Libertad, told poloff. Forty-six percent of respondents in the latest poll by the Center for Public Studies (CEP) said that they would never vote for him.
¶5. (SBU) Frei has been rejected by the new generation, Yanez continued, as demonstrated by the 30-point gap between the number of unregistered voters who support Frei and Pinera (24 versus 55 percent). (Note: Because few young people are registered to vote, the views of unregistered voters are often used as a proxy for opinions of the younger generation. End Note.) These views may well rub off on registered voters, or could have a direct impact on the election if proposed voting reforms usher in automatic registration in time for this year's election (Ref A).
Little Enthusiasm for Pinera
----------------------------
¶6. (C) While Alianza analysts do not see Frei as a particularly impressive opponent, they also appear underwhelmed by their own candidate, Sebastian Pinera. Asked to talk about how the Alianza views Pinera, two key insiders from Pinera's own National Renewal (RN) party--Rodrigo Yanez, the analyst from an RN-affiliated think tank, and RN International Relations Secretary Samuel Valenzuela--were noticeably reticent. Yanez referred only to polling results, highlighting that Pinera does well in attribute polling, i.e. questions about how the public sees his ability to manage different thematic areas from education to health to the economic crisis, as well as personal qualities like confidence.
¶7. (C) Valenzuela predicted that the left will try to use Pinera's image as a tycoon to demonize him. Indeed, Yanez noted that the Concertacion is already trying to put a negative spin on Pinera's commercial activities, suggesting that his business success is due to a penchant for speculation and that his behavior is emblematic of the sort of corporate practices that caused the financial crisis. However, these attempts appear to have been unsuccessful so far, with voters giving Pinera high marks for his ability to handle the financial crisis.
¶8. (C) Dario Paya, a parliamentarian and one of the founders of the staunchly conservative Independent Democratic Union party (UDI), was the most outspoken in his criticism of Pinera, describing him as having a ""big ego"" and telling Poloff ""Pinera's a jerk, but he can handle the job."" Pinera suffers from the perception that he buys his way through life and flouts the rules that govern most Chileans. Examples range from the idiosyncratic (illegally parking his helicopter on a municipal soccer field, causing a game to be delayed) to the serious (a USD 680,000 fine for insider trading).
Does Pinera Represent the Center?
---------------------------------
¶9. (C) Pinera's political evolution is likely to receive attention during the campaign. Born into a prominent Christian Democrat family, Pinera voted against continued Pinochet rule in the 1988 plebiscite and joined the National Renewal Party shortly after being elected to the Senate in 1990. Pinera has always tried to portray himself as a centrist rather than a conservative, but Paya believes that this characterization may ring hollow with voters. In Chile, la derecha"" (the right) is identified as much with wealth as with politics, and as a billionaire, Pinera is definitely a member of the club.
Comment
-------
¶10. (C) Just like their progressive rivals, conservative leaders appear to see both of this year's political candidates as uninspired, and hope that voters see their standard bearer as the better of the two options (refs B and C). Frei's candidacy may once again be overshadowed by questions of others' legacies. In 1999, he benefited from his father's glowing reputation, but ten years later, he may be a victim of Concertacion fatigue. Pinera's fortunes are equally hard to predict, though his billionaire status is likely to be an underlying theme: Is Pinera the financial messiah who can create jobs and insulate Chile from the global financial storm? Or is he the corporate Judas who has earned his thirty pieces of silver on the backs of Chilean consumers now facing an economic downturn? One thing is certain: if the Concertacion paints Pinera as a greedy tycoon, Alianza is likely to point a finger right back at Frei, who was a successful engineer for twenty years, eventually becoming a partner in one of Chile's largest engineering firms.
SIMONS