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INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9925
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9799
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4548
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 1170
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 6855
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 5782
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000454 

SIPDIS 

EO 12958 DECL: 03/02/2034 
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER 

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Mission Pakistan warmly welcomes your arrival in Islamabad. You are arriving in the midst of largely self-inflicted political turmoil following the Supreme Court’s decision to disqualify from public office Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif, political rivals of President Asif Zardari. Zardari engineered the Sharifs’ disqualification and followed that with placing his party’s governor in power in the Punjab provincial government to replace Shahbaz Sharif. At the moment, there are multiple efforts to reconcile Zardari with the Sharifs and to elect a replacement for Chief Minister Punjab. Unless the Punjab issue is resolved by March 12, a planned lawyers’ demonstration-that is backed by the Sharifs--could become violent. You thus will find your interlocutors distracted by domestic politics at a time when the GOP is struggling to meet IMF-imposed fiscal targets and militants are increasing their control over both the tribal areas and Swat, a once idyllic tourist destination 90 miles from Islamabad.

¶2. (C) You will be meeting with key interlocutors in our efforts to press the GOP for prosecution of the Mumbai detainees, assistance in effecting the release of kidnapped Americans John Solecki and David Rohde, and expanding law and order cooperation. The issue of FBI access to the Mumbai suspects remains very sensitive; a decision to send an investigative team to New Delhi currently rests on whether/how India responds to Pakistan’s 32 requests for additional information. President Zardari has over-reached in this current political crisis, but he remains secular, pro-American and our best ally in Pakistan right now. He likely will assure you that he has established a new anti-terrorism court that will deliver convictions on Mumbai.  Zardari will request additional USG support for the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) police; we will brief you on our train and equip plans for this critical part of our counter-terrorism strategy.

¶3. (C) DG ISI Pasha, whom you met in last week’s bilateral and trilateral strategic review in Washington, continues to profess a determination to end ISI’s overt and tacit support for proxy forces in the tribal areas, Afghanistan and Kashmir. Interior Minister Malik is Zardari’s point man on law and order and also serves as a political negotiator. Malik is very supportive of the U.S., but he wants to control every key issue personally, making it difficult for his staff to take any decisions without his approval. Intelligence Bureau (IB) Director General Suddle was personally selected for the job by Zardari; after a bungled attempt to place ISI under the Ministry of Interior, Zardari brought IB firmly under his control. Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) Director General Tariq Khosa is a well-respected cop, but he must work through MOI Malik. End Summary.

Domestic Situation
------------------ 
¶4. (C) The civilian government headed by President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani, elected one year ago, has been fairly stable. However, President Zardari has been preoccupied with his political rival former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. On February 25, Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruled that both Nawaz and his brother Shahbaz Sharif are ineligible to hold public office; Zardari followed that decision by appointing his party’s governor to rule in the Punjab (Pakistan’s most important province) pending elections to replace Shahbaz Sharif as Chief Minister. This has sparked country-wide protests and general political unrest. Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan (with an 83% approval rating compared to Zardari’s 20% in the latest IRI poll), but he does not have the votes to bring down the government. Instead, Nawaz Sharif is using popular outrage at the Supreme Court decision and “governor’s rule” to launch street protests. Zardari may win the short-term tactical battle against Nawaz; however, Nawaz is gaining ground by comparing Zardari’s high-handed rule to that of former President Musharraf. Nawaz Sharif is inspiring street demonstrations to coincide with a lawyers’ “Long March” on March 12-16. The chance for violence and chaos is likely during continued street protests.

¶5. (C) Although we do not believe Pakistan is a failed
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state, we nonetheless recognize that the challenges the state confronts are dire. The government is losing more and more territory every day to foreign and domestic militant groups; deteriorating law and order in turn is undermining economic recovery. The bureaucracy has settled into third-world mediocrity, as demonstrated by corruption and a limited capacity to implement or articulate policy. The court and legal system is slow to the point of inertia due to almost non-existent case management. These problems extend to law enforcement agencies, where the police are underpaid, lack technical capacity, and face stiff political pressures.

Security
--------- 
¶6. (C) The good news is that the Army/Frontier Corps are engaged in combat in the FATA and have just declared victory after a six month long battle in the Bajaur Agency. Zardari is committed to the fight; he knows that Osama bin Laden has publicly targeted Pakistan and admits “the militants are after me and my job.” The bad news is that the militants increasingly are setting the agenda. The government’s anti-terrorism strategy is based on “dialogue, deterrence and development;” however, it lacks the military capacity to deter militants and the financial resources to develop the FATA and NWFP. Its historic fallback has been to play for time by conducting negotiations with militants, a disastrous tactic that only has made the extremists stronger. The government insists it will negotiate with tribal leaders but not with militants.

¶7. (C) However, in the latest agreement in Swat (once a tourist resort approximately 90 miles from Islamabad), the provincial government agreed to negotiate for peace in exchange for imposition of Shari’a law with the Taliban. This was recognition of de-facto Taliban control, which produced beheadings, closure of girls’ schools, a growing exodus of terrified citizens, and the desertion of outgunned and outmanned police. Ham-handed military tactics, which included indiscriminate artillery bombardment, have further alienated a population that simply wants the fighting to end. In just a few short weeks, the deal is already proving to be an unpalatable one, with the militants demanding more ground and continuing violence against the civilian government.

¶8. (C) The military’s decision in 2008 to strike a deal with Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan helped to reduce the number of suicide bombings in Pakistan but gave Mehsud free rein to infiltrate his forces throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). He has exploited sectarian tensions and sent his fighters into Bajaur via Afghanistan to attack government positions. This has eroded Chief of Army Staff General Kayani’s strategy to gradually regain control of the FATA agency by agency. Rival Pakistani Taliban leaders Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir, and Gul Bahadur have formed a new alliance which they claim will focus on cross-border attacks. As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has been remarkably successful in disrupting al-Qaida operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In the past year, 10 of the top 20 al-Qaida operatives, including those responsible for the East Africa embassy bombings in 1998 and tied to Islambad’s Marriott bombing, have been eliminated.

Police/Law Enforcement
---------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) Although Pakistani security forces are now engaged in active combat against extremists, they lack the capability to deal with militants and criminal activity in the FATA and NWFP. The resulting decrease in security is impeding our efforts to implement development projects in support of critical U.S. national goals of eliminating terrorist safe havens in Pakistan and stabilizing Afghanistan. While there is a need for Pakistani military action now to deal with the large number of heavily armed militants operating in the border areas, the long-term solution to ensuring law and order throughout the country lies primarily with the civilian law enforcement agencies, not the military. To strengthen civilian law enforcement, State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) expanded program in 2009 involves two tracks, the first focusing on establishing a gendarmerie style force in NWFP suited for
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engaging and defeating heavily armed militants and criminal gangs. The second track involves expanding the current ICITAP, DS/ATA and other efforts in providing specialist and advanced training to specific elements of the Pakistani police establishment.

¶10. (SBU) In conjunction with INL’s police program, the Department of State’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) will focus on providing expanded training and consultation opportunities to the NWFP, Balochistan, and federal areas to expand rapidly the GOP’s antiterrorist capabilities. This expanded training will focus on building tactical, technical, and investigative skill sets in specialized Pakistani law enforcement agencies. Training for these and other units will focus on “hard skill” tactical training (i.e. protecting VIPs, quick reaction forces, explosives detection/disposal) most urgently needed by the GOP given the deteriorating security environment that it confronts. There will also be an expanded effort to develop national and provincial-level forensics and investigative capabilities and anti-kidnapping procedures. ATA was instrumental in establishing and funding the FIA’s Special Investigative Group (SIG). In 2007, ATA offered to fund expansion of the SIG by 100 officers and pay salaries for the new officers; we still await an official response from MOI.

¶11. (C) Through the Rewards for Justice program, the USG is ready to assist Pakistan in establishing a National Safety Hotline, through which MOI can collect information from Pakistani citizens on terrorists and planned/executed terrorist incidents in Pakistan. The GOP would serve as the public “front” of the Rewards program; all U.S. funding and cooperation would remain discreet. The GOP would serve asthe conduit for any eventual reward payments, and a DOD MIST team has developed a media campaign in support of the Rewards program. The GOP will provide daily logistical and administrative support; RSO will provide to administrative personnel to assist in collecting the tip information.

Visa Processing
---------------- 
¶12. (C) Post-9/11 changes to improve U.S. border security have dramatically increased the length of time it takes Pakistani citizens to obtain U.S. visitor visas. The local press and many politicians repeatedly criticize delays in visa processing and difficulties encountered at U.S. ports of entry, often citing them as examples of U.S. bias against Pakistan. On a practical level, the delays impair U.S. efforts to train law enforcement and military personnel, and to promote exchanges and academic programs with civilian authorities. While the USG does not comment on the reasons for the delay, Pakistan authorities know that an interagency security clearance process, which includes the FBI, is the main factor. You may hear complaints about this issue during your meetings in Islamabad, as well as calls for more effort on the U.S. part to improve the process.

Mumbai
------ 
¶13. (C) Indo-Pak tensions are still simmering, but to avoid a potential Indian military strike, the GOP needs to continue to show progress on prosecuting those Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives responsible for the Mumbai attacks. On February 12, the GOP filed official charges against 13 suspects, including LeT leaders Javed Iqbal Laqvi, Zarrar Shah, and Abu al-Qama. Currently the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) has at least 7 of these suspects in custody; and they face charges under Pakistan’s penal code, cyber crimes regulations, and the Anti-Terrorism Act. India has welcomed the GOP decision to file formal charges against the key masterminds of Mumbai; Islamabad now awaits an Indian response to requests for additional information (32 questions, including request for forensics, ballistics reports, etc) from New Delhi to support prosecution. Based on the Indian response, Pakistan will consider sending an FIA team to New Delhi to follow up; we should encourage that team to go to New Delhi and continue to press for additional closures of LeT camps and Jamaat-ud-Dawa “charitable” activities, particularly in Punjab. The issue of FBI access to the Mumbai detainees remains a politically sensitive one you will want to raise directly with MOI Malik.
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Kidnapping Cases
---------------- 
¶14. (S) The Embassy appreciates ongoing FBI support to resolve a significant number of kidnapping cases involving Amcits in Pakistan. We will update you on current efforts to secure the release of UNHCR representative John Solecki and New York Times reporter David Rohde. A video of Mr. Solecki was released on February 13 which was accompanied by a statement demanding the release of Baloch prisoners in the hands of the government. The Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF - a previously unknown group) is holding Solecki and made fresh demands on March 1 that all incarcerated women be released within 72 hours or BLUF will kill Solecki. The GOP continues to insist that Brahamdagh Bugti, a Baloch separatist leader, is responsible for the kidnapping.
PATTERSON