VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0462/01 2091401
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281401Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4621
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000462 

SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2029 
TAGS: PHUM PREL ECON CU
SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN CUBA 

REF: HAVANA 443 

Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

¶1. (SBU) This front channel cable was originally sent as 
Official/Informal in reftel. The following is a collection 
of observations by outgoing human rights officer on the state 
of human rights and civil society in Cuba. 

¶2. (C) CONTINUITY: Repeat visitors to Cuba, whether they 
have been gone for a matter of months or years, always are 
struck by the impression that everything seems exactly the 
way it was when they left. Whether it is the absence of 
Fidel Castro from the scene or the abrupt discharge of the 
two government officials most known to foreigners, the 
Government of Cuba (GOC) seems endlessly capable of returning 
to a condition of stasis. In the fall of 2008 three 
hurricanes severely battered the island's economy prompting 
many to speculate that the system could not recover from the 
devastation. However, nearly all observers have been amazed 
at the steady progress the GOC has made in restoring the 
miserable but adequate quality of living in place before the 
disasters. The GOC faces serious challenges but its ability 
to muddle through cannot be underestimated. The Cuban people 
under the numbing effects of decades of repression, have long 
been accustomed to adapting, often with remarkable ingenuity, 
to whatever new deprivation comes their way. There is no 
reason to think that a new round of ration reductions or 
rolling power outages will change this fact. Noted 
opposition leader Oswaldo Paya has stated quite candidly that 
a situation of a growing opposition, in which the Cuban 
people become increasingly willing to demonstrate and demand 
their rights until the present regime is forced to yield to 
popular pressure, is a fantasy that exists only in the minds 
of those living off the island. Paya believes that a rapid, 
near overnight collapse of the system into total chaos is a 
far more likely scenario. 

¶3. (C) THE INEFFECTUAL OPPOSITION: The Cuban opposition is 
small and divided into dozens of tiny groups, often with 
seemingly similar goals, but unable to coordinate their 
activities in any significant way. Although several 
opposition leaders, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, have a great deal of personal courage, they remain largely isolated from the community as a whole. Genuine opposition groups are heavily infiltrated by state 
security. Several others are state security fronts. Others 
exist only on paper and their only activities consist of 
taking photographs of six to ten people in a room holding up 
CAMBIO stickers and generating membership lists for the 
purpose of filing refugee cases. For the past two years the 
GOC has very effectively used the tactic of short term 
detentions to prevent any attempts to hold meetings or 
demonstrations. People are typically detained on the way to 
an opposition activity and then released some hours later 
without charges. As a result, the GOC has silenced 
dissenting voices without getting the type of international 
condemnation that earlier tactics of political trials and 
lengthy jail sentences of dissidents engendered. Over the 
past several months there has been a concerted campaign to 
provoke discord within the opposition that has had a 
devastating effect on major dissident organizations. Unity 
projects have crumbled, accusations are levied back and forth 
that prominent opposition figures are working for state 
security, bitter disputes have arisen over tactics, and 
organizations have split over rival leadership claims. Many 
opposition leaders have been approved for refugee status 
recently, and state security is able to dangle the "tarjeta 
blanca", an essential document for legal departure from the 
country, in front of many people to pressure them into 
informing on or sowing dissent among their colleagues within 
the opposition. Even though opposition members recognize 
these regime efforts at provocation, they still readily fall 
into mutual recriminations and bitter personal quarrels. 

¶4. (C) In addition, and much like the regime, the 
opposition is aging and few younger people are joining its 
ranks. Even youthful opposition groups that seemed promising 
four or five years ago have been decimated by emigration and 
their leaders, now well in their 30's, have not been able to 

renew their membership base. Many of the prominent figures 
that are critical of the government, such as the independent 
bloggers, state that they cannot relate to the traditional 
opposition. Frequently they see themselves as part of a 
cultural community that has no relation with the political 
opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX told poloff that when someone does something challenging artistically, the artist receives no support from the political opposition, and therefore feels no inclination to support dissident activities. 

¶5. (C) DISILLUSIONED YOUTH: The most dramatic failure of 
the Cuban Revolution has been the creation of the "new man", 
as Che Guevara termed him, who would work for the benefit of 
society without regard to self interest. Cuban youth are 
overwhelmingly bitter and disillusioned and see no future 
except the possibility of leaving Cuba. This bitterness is 
acute among the professional classes who, after years of 
training, cannot pursue employment in their fields at low 
salaries, and instead find themselves hustling after jobs in 
the tourist sector. After years of indoctrination, young 
people are often completely turned off by politics, and do 
not relate at all to the traditional opposition. However, 
they are hungry for opportunity and dialogue, as long as it 
is not done in a heavy-handed way or with anything that 
smacks of propaganda and recruitment. When USINT offered 
scholarship programs for community college and a summer 
institute, more than 600 applicants applied and most had had 
no previous contact with USINT. The applicants were 
surprisingly technologically savvy considering that in Cuba 
only 2% of the population reportedly has access to some form 
of the internet. 

¶6. (C) THE RACIAL DIVIDE: In spite of official statistics 
to the contrary, African descendent Cubans probably 
constitute a majority of the population. However, they 
occupy few leading positions in government, state owned 
industries and academia. They live in the poorest and most 
marginal neighborhoods. They rarely occupy jobs with access 
to hard currency in the tourist industry. Refugee applicants 
are disproportionately white. African descendants have far 
fewer relatives in other countries and so by and large do not 
have relatives who can either send remittances or pay for 
them to be smuggled into other countries. African 
descendants rarely take to the seas in rustic vessels, partly 
because for years they have been told that racism in the 
United States is as brutal as it was 60 years ago. Accounts 
from inmates indicate that as much as 80% of the prison 
population are of African descent. Due to emigration, Cuban 
society is becoming increasingly black resulting in much more 
overt racism than was seen in the past. Nevertheless, there 
is complete silence from the GOC on the topic of racial 
prejudice, the official line being that racism was a problem 
solved by the Revolution. There are many people of good will 
who fear for the future of their nation, and who are 
initiating dialogue aimed at restoring integration and racial 
harmony. After all the GOC told African descendants about 
life in the United States, they view the election of Barack 
Obama as a miraculous event. There is a great desire to 
discover what can be learned from the U.S. experience with 
race relations. 

¶7. (C) THE BATTLE FOR PRIVATE SPACE: Besides the parts of 
the cultural community who challenge the status quo, and 
those who are working towards racial integration, there are 
other not officially sanctioned groups trying to address 
social issues. They don't view their work as related to the 
political opposition. These include advocates for homosexual 
rights and those trying to work on women's issues. The 
homosexual advocates, while welcoming statements against 
prejudice by Mariela Castro, the daughter of Raul Castro who 
heads the Center for Sexual Education, are upset that she 
says nothing about employment discrimination and police 
harassment. There are local people in Cuba trying to 
intervene at the community level in cases of domestic 
violence. It is doubtful whether the GOC would allow a much 
more organized private effort to confront these and other 
insufficiently addressed problem areas. 

¶8. (C) RELIGION: The group that has been most successful 

at creating space beyond the government's control has been 
the religious community. This has been a very slow process 
and the leading religious organizations have always known not 
to test the limits too far. Considering that only a few 
decades ago the GOC sought an eradication of religion, it is 
notable how the faith of many Cuban people remains strong. 
Even though the GOC is now seeking an accommodation with 
religious groups that still allows government control, 
religious groups have gradually regained ownership of their 
buildings and expanded their facilities. They increasingly 
issue their own publications, and conduct adult education and 
community service projects. Even though religious 
organization avoid confrontation, and look towards achieving 
very small goals, such as permission for one additional 
procession or a few more minutes of radio time, they are the 
only groups within Cuban civil society with absolute 
confidence that they will outlast the regime. Religious 
organizations should not be overlooked as agents of 
transformational change. 
FARRAR