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RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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231668
2009-10-27 22:20:00
09MEXICO3092
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003092 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2028 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR UN MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO: THE LEGACY OF PGR'S MEDINA MORA 
 
REF: MEXICO CITY 002759 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.  Reason: 1 
.4 (b),(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  With his resignation on September 8, Mexican 
Attorney General (AG) Eduardo Medina Mora Icaza leaves a 
two-fold legacy.  His tenure in office was very positive for 
the USG, as he forged a solid relationship with us, offered 
full support on high-level extradition cases, and laid the 
groundwork for future bilateral cooperation.  He was clearly 
committed to cracking down on Mexico's drug cartels and took 
a strong stand on high-level corruption within his 
institution. Notwithstanding his considerable achievements, 
he lacked the political heft and possibly the institutional 
vision necessary to transform fully the Attorney General's 
Office (PGR) and make significant advances on crucial justice 
reform issues. His modest record of convictions of thousands 
arrested on drug-related charges, and his reservations with 
regard to the more aggressive use of his office, clearly 
contributed to Calderon's decision to replace him.  Medina 
Mora's biggest failure may have been his inability to 
overcome the deep personal animosity he had with Secretary 
Garcia Luna of the Secretariat for Public Security (SSP), a 
source of additional tension between the PGR and the SSP that 
undermined Mexico's counternarcotics effort and complicated 
our Merida Initiative programming.  End Summary. 
 
Producing Results .... 
 
¶2. (SBU)  As the head of the PGR, Medina Mora was viewed as 
one of the key members of Calderon's security team leading 
the fight against organized crime.  During his tenure, Mexico 
realized new records in seizing cash - at least $214 million 
dollars in drug money, though $207.4 million dollars came 
from Chinese-born businessman Zhenli Ye Gon - and drugs, most 
notably 35.1 tons of cocaine in two operations in October 
¶2007.  Medina Mora also banned the importation of 
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, the drug used to manufacture 
methamphetamine, into Mexico. 
 
¶3. (U)  Recognizing the importance of a strong relationship 
with the U.S. in Mexico's fight against organized crime, 
Medina Mora played a lead role in forging greater 
collaboration between our two countries. DOJ and DEA 
officials praise Medina Mora for working through Mexico's 
legal morass to produce record numbers of extraditions, 
including many high-value targets.  In January 2007 alone, 
Mexico extradited 15 fugitives to the U.S. including leader 
of the Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, with another 10 
fugitives on the U.S. Most Wanted List extradited in December 
¶2008. 
 
¶4. (C) On the sensitive issue of arms trafficking, USG 
officials generally credit Medina Mora with pushing for a 
constructive and collaborative approach, rather than trying 
to score cheap political points by attacking the Second 
Amendment or publicly bashing the repeal of the Assault 
Weapons Ban.  There were some exceptions to his largely 
positive collaboration, notably, at a conference in December 
2008 where Medina Mora criticized the U.S. for having done 
little to curb the illegal transfer of arms into Mexico. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Perhaps most importantly, Medina Mora proved a key 
player for the GOM in defining the Merida Initiative and 
establishing areas for assistance and cooperation in terms of 
equipment and training programs.  He also sought greater 
cooperation with Colombia on fighting the drug cartels.  This 
collaboration culminated in the Tripartite Agreement - an 
agreement between Colombia, the U.S., and Mexico that helped 
bring about the capture of several high-value Colombian 
targets in Mexico. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Medina Mora also took unprecedented steps to attack 
corruption within PGR, the police, and local governments. 
The anti-corruption investigative initiative "Operacion 
Limpieza" led to the arrest of several high-level officials, 
including his subordinate - former Chief Organized Crime 
Prosecutor Noe Ramirez - arrested for passing information 
about police operations to the drug cartels and receiving 
monetary compensation.  Medina Mora also had several mayors 
arrested on charges of corruption, though this operation was 
marred by accusations that political considerations had 
driven the arrests. 
 
 
MEXICO 00003092  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Medina Mora's supporters applaud his efforts to 
modernize the PGR.  During his tenure, he created the 
Costanza Project, a $200 million dollar initiative designed 
to transform PGR's culture in part by promoting transparency, 
training attorneys to build stronger cases, and digitizing 
files in order to incorporate a paperless system.  We are 
hopeful that this program will be operational by next year 
and that the new AG, Arturo Chavez Chavez, will continue 
supporting its mandate.  As another example of Medina Mora's 
commitment to efficiency, Oscar Rocha, a Senior Advisor to 
Medina Mora, pointed to his role in expediting the issuance 
of search warrants - a process that used to require working 
through local judges in cities where the property was 
located.  Now seven designated judges located in the capital, 
working on a 24/7 rotational basis, can issue the warrants 
for any property in Mexico through an electronic application 
process. 
 
 
But Falling Short in Some Key Respects 
 
¶8. (C)  On the downside, many of Medina Mora's critics 
complain he did little to settle the historical rift between 
PGR and the SSP.  Given the personal animosity between Medina 
Mora and Garcia Luna, the relationship deteriorated during 
Medina Mora's time at PGR.  The inability of Medina Mora to 
strategize and work together with Garcia Luna hindered drug 
enforcement efforts and the PGR's capacity to prosecute 
criminals.  Rocha ascribed the difficult relationship to 
differing philosophies as to which agency should be 
responsible for carrying out investigations.  Whereas Medina 
Mora believed Mexican law gave the PGR the lead investigative 
authority, Garcia Luna was keen on seeing the police assume a 
wider role. 
 
¶9. (C) Others fault Media Mora for not doing enough to 
promote greater transparency.  As one example,   PGR provided 
little information regarding the steps it was taking to 
institute justice reform, information we need to establish 
our own program priorities.   Emboffs also found it difficult 
to obtain information from PGR on cases it was investigating 
in a number of sensitive areas including human rights, TIP, 
and crimes against journalists.  Judicial officials from 
several Mexican states complained about Medina Mora's uneven 
communication with them on reforms and investigations, 
hindering their efforts in both of these areas.   Similarly, 
the PGR never submitted its Merida coordination work proposal 
to USAID, a document we requested to facilitate the 
identification of priorities and the implementation of key 
programs.  It is unclear if Medina Mora felt these issues 
were lower priority of if he simply failed to empower staff 
to work them thoroughly. 
 
¶10.  (C) Representatives of Mexico's NGO community, as well 
as the quasi-governmental National Commission on Human Rights 
(CNDH), faulted Medina Mora for prioritizing operational 
objectives over longer term reform.  Some blame him for 
securing adoption of reforms that violate the due process 
rights of defendants, such as the establishment of pre-charge 
detention ("arraigo") - for up to 80 days - for defendants 
implicated in organized crime activity.  Many welcomed 
Mexico's adoption of a TIP law in 2008 but criticized PGR for 
assigning responsibility and oversight to two offices - its 
organized crime unit in SIEDO and its Crimes Against Women 
Office in FEVIMTRA - creating competing jurisdictions for 
dealing with TIP cases.  Even Rocha conceded this was not the 
optimal way to handle these cases. 
 
¶11. (C)  Much of the blame foisted upon Medina Mora for 
delays in prosecuting criminals has more to do with Mexico's 
antiquated justice system than with personal inadequacies or 
lack of concern.  Marcos Fastlicht, Director of PGR's Council 
of Civic Participation, insisted Medina Mora genuinely 
supported justice reform but could not always count on the 
institutional or political backing he needed to produce 
changes across the board.  Rocha stated that Medina Mora, 
with his connections to the opposition PRI, often had 
disagreements with Calderon because he failed to tout the PAN 
party line. 
 
¶12. (C) Comment. A seasoned political player with allies 
across the political spectrum, Medina Mora worked proactively 
with us on cleaning house, improving training in the PGR, and 
extraditions.  His critics contend he could have done more to 
implement judicial reform and bridge gaps with the SSP.  New 
 
MEXICO 00003092  003 OF 003 
 
 
AG Chavez' strong PAN credentials will help him with the 
Presidency, but there are those who believe Medina Mora's 
replacement is a less capable political operator, who will be 
overshadowed by Garcia Luna and stymied by his considerable 
human rights baggage (reftel).  The challenge of building 
bridges with the SSP remains considerable and will require 
Chavez to be both tough and adroit in dealing with the 
difficult politics he faces. Implementing justice reform that 
transforms PGR into a more transparent, pragmatic, and nimble 
institution that works effectively with SSP will prove a tall 
challenge for Chavez Chavez as well.  End Comment 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
 
FEELEY