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RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
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239746
2009-12-14 15:23:00
09MONTERREY453
Consulate Monterrey
CONFIDENTIAL
09MONTERREY415
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FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4146
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 5231
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9774

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MONTERREY 000453 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/14/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KCRM KCOR ASEC SNAR PHUM SOCI MX
SUBJECT: MONTERREY SHOOTOUTS LEAVE 17 DEAD, EXPOSE SHORTCOMINGS IN 
STATE'S CRIME FIGHTING APPARATUS 
 
REF: A) MONTERREY 415 
 
MONTERREY 00000453  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, US Consulate 
General Monterrey, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  A wave of gang violence rocked Monterrey on 
December 4 as well-armed criminals faced down the Mexican 
marines in the Monterrey suburb of Juarez during an attempt to 
arrest a Los Zetas drug gang leader implicated in the 
assassination of a suburban police chief.  The day culminated in 
a major jailbreak which saw 23 alleged gang members and 
sympathizers set free and led to an hours-long shutdown of a 
major northern thoroughfare.  In the aftermath of the action, 
termed by one newspaper as Nuevo Leon's "bloodiest day," 17 
people lay dead, several more were wounded and authorities 
arrested 16 gang members.  Officials are still unsure as to 
whether the original target of the operation, Ricardo Almanza 
Morales, aka "El Gori 1" escaped or was killed in the fight. 
The run-up to the firefight and the events surrounding it 
underscored a concerning lack of coordination, and possibly 
will, among key elements in the fight against the drug cartels. 
End summary. 
 
Arrest Attempt Becomes Battle 
----------------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) On December 4, Mexican marines, dispatched by Navy 
commanders, stormed a ranch in the Monterrey suburb of Juarez in 
an attempt to capture Ricardo Almanza Morales, aka "El Gori 1," 
the alleged planner of the November 4 execution of the police 
chief in the Monterrey suburb of Garcia (ref A.)  The fighting 
began just before Friday rush hour and much of the later action 
occurred in a suburban area, next to the major highway from 
Monterrey to the border crossing in Hidalgo, TX, which was 
closed for much of the evening.  This phase of the battle 
culminated in a thirty minute shootout during which eight 
members of the Los Zetas drug gang and one marine were killed. 
Nine Zeta gangsters were arrested. 
 
Phase 2:  Firefight Intensifies 
------------------------------- 
¶3.  (C) The battle escalated when, following the initial 
confrontation, the marines requested support from a local army 
unit to transport a wounded marine and prisoners from the ranch. 
 A group of Los Zetas traveling in a convoy of 10 - 12 SUVs 
attacked the army reinforcements using grenades and high-powered 
assault rifles as they were en route to rendezvous with the 
marines.  A second shootout ensued, in which two more Zeta 
members and one innocent bystander were killed and a young girl 
was mortally wounded.  Multiple vehicles exploded during the 
battle, killing at least two unidentified passengers who were 
handcuffed in the back of an SUV belonging to Los Zetas. 
Military officials arrested seven Zetas during this second 
confrontation and an unknown number of gangsters fled the scene. 
 The next day, local newspapers prominently featured graphic 
photos of the dead and wounded along with burning vehicles.  One 
local newspaper, "El Milenio," termed December 4 Nuevo Leon's 
"bloodiest day" in Mexico's drug war. 
 
Jailbreak in Aftermath 
---------------------- 
¶4.  (C) Approximately one hour after the second gun battle, a 
group of Los Zetas drove through the gate of a jail in Escobedo, 
another Monterrey suburb, killed two federal police agents, 
wounded several others and released 23 of the 24 prisoners being 
held at the facility.  DEA sources said that fifteen of the 
escapees, including two police officers, were members of a Zeta 
kidnapping cell arrested by the Mexican army in October.  The 
two officers in charge of the jail claimed that they were out 
getting hot dogs when their jail was overrun.  This was the 
fourth jailbreak organized by Los Zetas in Monterrey's consular 
district in the last eight months.  (Comment:  According to law 
enforcement sources, the jailbreaks have become particularly 
troublesome, not just because of their increasing frequency and 
brazenness, but because prisoners (especially police officers) 
who are released by Los Zetas become instantly beholden to them, 
if they were not already.  End comment.) 
 
Victims or Perpetrators? 
------------------------ 
¶5.  (C) Press reports and law enforcement authorities claimed 
that the handcuffed passengers killed in the second 
confrontation were kidnapping victims, but Monterrey DEA sources 
said the bodies were burned beyond recognition and may never be 
identified.  Mexican law enforcement sources told Post that 
narcotraffickers now commonly handcuff themselves if it appears 
that capture is imminent in an effort to look like innocent 
kidnapping victims and avoid arrest.  (Comment:  High profile 
kidnappings have continued in Monterrey and its affluent San 
Pedro suburb.  Three prominent San Pedro businessmen have been 
kidnapped over the last two weeks, with one paid ransom 
 
MONTERREY 00000453  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
purportedly around US$ 5 million.  Two of the kidnapping victims 
are still missing.  End comment.) 
 
"Gori 1 - 4":  The Almanza Brothers 
----------------------------------- 
¶6.  (C) The marines' target, Ricardo Almanza Morales (aka El 
Gori 1), is one of four brothers involved with Los Zetas.  Each 
of the Almanza brothers is known as "El Gori" (a derivative of 
the word gorilla in Spanish) because of their distinctive facial 
features.  Brothers Raymundo Almanza (El Gori 2) and Octavio 
Almanza (El Gori 4) are both in custody in Mexico.  El Gori 2 
was arrested in May and, according to DEA sources, had been in 
charge of organizing Los Zetas arms shipments from Belize and 
Guatemala.  El Gori 4 is the suspected mastermind of the 
February execution of General Mauro Enrique Tello Quinones in 
Cancun and has been implicated in the 2008 slayings of nine army 
soldiers in Monterrey. 
 
¶7.  (C) El Gori 3, Eduardo Almanza, is also associated with Los 
Zetas, but law enforcement sources say that he is the least 
important and influential of the brothers within the 
organization.  All of the brothers were close associates of 
former Monterrey plaza boss Sigifredo Najera-Talamantes, aka 
"Canicon", who was arrested in Saltillo, Coahuila this March and 
are suspected to have been involved in numerous kidnappings and 
homicides in the Monterrey metropolitan area. 
 
Which "Gori" Was Killed?  Confusion Over Identities 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶8.  (C) The press has widely reported that Ricardo Almanza (El 
Gori 1) died during the first firefight at the Juarez ranch on 
December 4.  However, Post DEA determined that, based on army 
fingerprint records, only Eduardo Almanza (El Gori 4) could be 
confirmed dead.  To further confuse the situation, on December 
8, a woman claiming to be the mother of the Almanza brothers 
told the media that she does not have a son named Ricardo and 
that only her son Eduardo had been killed.  DEA sources also 
confirmed that, contrary to media reports, Monterrey Zeta leader 
Jesus Alvarado-Sigaros, aka "El Flaco," had not been listed 
among those killed in Juarez. 
 
Law Enforcement, Military Struggle to Effectively Face Cartels 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
¶9.  (C) In Nuevo Leon, the public has applauded the army, with 
many business and civic leaders noting that over the past 
eighteen months it has been the only local institution capable 
of directly confronting the cartels.  In this case, despite 
having intelligence as to Ricardo Almanza's location, army 
officials declined to take action, claiming his hideout was too 
well-fortified.  In contrast, after navy officials learned of 
his whereabouts, they sent the marines to arrest him - the first 
such marine action in the state.  The army was apparently 
unaware of the marines' activities until they called the army 
for support during the operation.  Afterwards, army generals 
complained to Post that the navy action had made them look 
ineffective. 
 
¶10.  (C) At a December 7 meeting with CG, ICE, DEA and ATF, 
Nuevo Leon State Prosecutor Alejandro Garza y Garza used the 
events in Juarez to highlight shortcomings in the local law 
enforcement community.  He said that the first two local police 
officers to arrive at the gun battle in Juarez fled the scene. 
(Note:  State Secretary of Public Safety Carlos Jauregui 
confirmed to RSO on December 10 that several police officials 
reportedly fled after the marines appeared.  End note.) 
 
¶11.  (C) To further illustrate the complexity of coordinating 
law enforcement actions, Garza displayed aerial photos of a 
parking lot at the Santa Lucia Riverwalk (a popular Monterrey 
tourist destination modeled after the river walk in San Antonio) 
where gangsters armed with semi-automatic weapons were charging 
visitors for parking and using the lot to store stolen cars.  By 
the time the state called the military in to dislodge them from 
the lot (located on state land) and regained control of the 
property, the stolen cars had disappeared. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶12.  (C) The confusion surrounding this latest incident in 
Monterrey served to highlight the lack of coordination and will 
among law enforcement officials as they struggle to deal with 
increasing organized crime violence.  The army, long considered 
the most reliable partner in the struggle to contain the 
cartels, surprisingly refused to take the lead in capturing a 
criminal responsible for assassinating a former army general, 
leaving the navy as the only dependable actor in this case. 
 
MONTERREY 00000453  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶13.  (C) Cartels have continued to operate with impunity in 
Nuevo Leon.  Ricardo Almanza (El Gori 1) moved openly in a large 
convoy throughout the Monterrey metropolitan area for a month 
after being named the prime suspect behind the assassination of 
the Garcia police chief, the state was unable to stop a major 
prison break despite having already been alerted to intense 
criminal activity in the area, and organized criminals operated 
a stolen car ring in broad view on state property.  Authorities 
also lack the forensic capability needed to identify victims 
and, presumably, to conduct thorough crime scene investigations. 
 If there is a positive side, it appears that government 
operations have forced Los Zetas to resort to risky jail breaks 
to replenish their ranks with seasoned gangsters.  However, due 
to a combination of police incompetence and corruption, they 
have been able to successfully do so. 
 
¶14.  (C) The long-term ability of the government to fight the 
cartels is hampered by budgetary concerns (only around 3.5% of 
the state's budget is dedicated to law enforcement and 
prosecution) and corruption.  Secretary of Public Safety Carlos 
Jauregui and State Prosecutor Alejandro Garza y Garza confirmed 
to RSO on December 10 that Nuevo Leon is having difficulty 
recruiting competent police officers because of low pay and 
safety concerns and that its new C5 command and control facility 
is understaffed.  (Note: In an effort to address concerns over 
chronically low pay, Jauregui has sought to increase police 
salaries and started a program to help officers pay for housing. 
 End note) 
 
¶15.  (C) Jauregui told RSO that his force of 4,000 police 
officers is 1,000 members below its target size and that, of 
those 4,000 officers, only about one quarter are doing 
substantive police work, the rest being assigned to 
administrative or protective duties.  It is unlikely that the 
state will be able to fill those 1,000 positions any time soon; 
Jauregui admitted that only 10 percent of prospective police 
recruits are able to clear the vetting process.  Until state 
officials address these inherent problems with law enforcement, 
Nuevo Leon seems condemned to take one step forward and two 
backward in its ongoing campaign against organized crime. 
WILLIAMSONB