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RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/HQ USNORTHCOM
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RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
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242660,1/6/2010 17:47,10MEXICO27,"Embassy Mexico",UNCLASSIFIED,10STATE109980,"VZCZCXRO1927
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FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9658
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000027 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE AND WHA/MEX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO - COUNTRY TERRORISM REPORT FOR 2009 
 
REF: STATE 109980 
 
¶1. No known international terrorist organizations have an 
operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist incidents 
targeting U.S. interests/personnel have occurred on or 
originated from Mexican territory. Mexico continues to 
confront well-armed, organized crime elements in several 
regions of the country and traditional hot spots for 
narcotics trafficking have seen record levels of violence. 
Small and weak anti-social groups perpetrated isolated acts 
of vandalism with the intention of disrupting commercial 
stability and raising awareness of their cause. Although no 
international terrorist organizations have sought to use 
Mexico as a haven for operations, the organized crime 
syndicates and the consequent security problems on the border 
pose a vulnerability that could allow for a future terrorist 
transit point into the U.S. The Mexican Government remains a 
highly committed partner and shows no sign of complacency in 
its fight against organized crime and remains vigilant 
against domestic and international terrorist threats. 
 
¶2. Although incidents of domestic terrorism have not 
increased over the past year, Mexico received threats from a 
previously active group and witnessed the emergence of a new 
element. El Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR) dissolved 
talks with the Government of Mexico in April and threatened 
to reemploy violent measures to force a response to its 
demands for a government investigation into the disappearance 
of two of its members. In 2007, it launched two attacks on 
petroleum pipelines. In 2009, no acts of terrorism were 
attributed to the EPR. From May to August, the animal 
liberation front, ALF, claimed responsibility for attacking 
banks and commercial sites throughout Mexico,s capital city 
using propane tank bombs. Three bombs were discovered 
unexploded, while another three caused property damage but no 
casualties. 
 
¶3. Levels of organized crime and narcotics violence rose 
significantly in the traditional hot spots along the border 
and in marijuana cultivation regions. Cartels increasingly 
use military-style terrorist tactics to intimidate Mexican 
security forces and establish dominance in specific regions. 
In June, the Michoacan-based La Familia organization carried 
out a series of retaliatory attacks that killed 12 federal 
police personnel in response to the apprehension of a 
high-level drug trafficker. The speed, precision, and tactics 
used by several groups indicated that the actions were well 
coordinated and the perpetrators well trained. The state of 
Chihuahua experienced an increase in narcotics-related deaths 
as rival cartels used sophisticated communications procedures 
and military weaponry to target and assassinate rival cartel 
members. There is no apparent evidence of ties between 
Mexican organized crime syndicates and international 
terrorist groups. The violence attributed to organized crime 
groups on the border, however, continues to strain Mexico,s 
law enforcement capacities creating potential vulnerabilities 
in terms of terrorist exploitation seeking access to the U.S 
through Mexico. 
 
¶4. Currently, there is no indication that terrorist 
organizations are using Mexico as a conduit for illicit 
activities. Nevertheless, Mexico,s still nascent capacity to 
counter money laundering suggests a potential vulnerability. 
The Mexican Attorney General,s (PGR) Organized Crime 
Division,s (SIEDO) money laundering unit investigates and 
prosecutes money laundering crimes in Mexico with mixed 
results. The majority of its investigations are linked to 
organized crime and drug proceeds. Currently, drug proceeds 
in Mexico are laundered primarily in the form  bulk currency 
movements or through currency exchange houses, such as casas 
de cambio and smaller centros cambiarios. In order to combat 
the illegal movement of funds, Mexican financial institutions 
typically follow international standards such as &know your 
customer8 and due diligence advocated by the Financial 
Action Task Force (FAFT) Recommendations. These institutions 
also terminate the accounts of individuals and entities 
identified on international country lists such as the Office 
of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) Specially Designated National 
and Blocked Persons List. Furthermore, Mexican financial 
institutions follow the Ley de Institciones de Crdito, 
Artculo 115, Disposicin 68 y 41 (Law of Credit 
 
MEXICO 00000027  002 OF 003 
 
 
Institutions, Article 115, Sub article 68 and 41) as ordered 
by the Mexican Treasury and supervised by the CNBV or 
Comisin Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (National Bank and 
Securities Commission). This law requires banks to consult 
recognized international and country lists of individuals 
involved in terrorism or other illicit activities and submit 
a &suspicious activities report8 within 24 hours to the 
Mexican Department of Treasury,s Financial Intelligence Unit 
(UIF) on the activities of any individual on that list. 
 
¶5. The Government of Mexico has stepped up efforts to improve 
interagency coordination as part of its campaign to combat 
crime and prevent terrorism. It has created a national 
database known as Plataforma Mexico designed to promote 
greater information exchange and overall interoperability 
across Mexico,s numerous and disparate police entities. 
Tactical Intelligence Operations Units (UNITO) represent a 
new Government of Mexico mechanism that brings together all 
federal agencies in a given state to coordinate intelligence 
and operations.  Command, control, communications, and 
computer centers (also known as C-4 centers) located in 
several states vary in capabilities from simple call centers 
to analytical cells that produce analysis and support the 
development of operations. The U.S. directly supports 
programs to help both the Secretariat for Public Security 
(SSP) and the PGR train federal investigators and facilitate 
greater operational coordination and effectiveness. 
 
¶6. The U.S. and the Government of Mexico worked together to 
address a number of challenges in connection to Mexico,s 
southern and northern borders in 2009. The U.S. deployed two 
teams to Mexico,s southern border to conduct assessments. 
Its border with Guatemala and Belize remains very porous and 
poses a vulnerability in terms of serving as potential 
terrorist transit point. The U.S. is working with the 
Government of Mexico to address resource requirements and 
offer some best practices applied effectively at other ports 
of entry. The U.S. and the Government of Mexico agreed to 
coordinate actions at the northern border ports of entry in 
order to obstruct the flow of illegal arms and currency 
across the U.S./Mexico border. Pilot programs in Nogales and 
Eagle Pass are proving to be successful by increasing the 
number of vehicles inspected while lowering the wait time at 
the border crossing. The U.S. supported the establishment of 
the Mexico Targeting Center, modeled after the CBP National 
Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C) which should strengthen 
Mexico,s ability to target suspicious or illicit cargo 
entering or leaving Mexico. The Advance Passenger Information 
system (APIS) supports targeting efforts, increases 
information sharing, and enhances intelligence capabilities 
in identify special interest aliens (SIA) at ports of entry. 
The U.S. and the Government of Mexico also commenced the 
Joint Security Program (JSP) for Travelers, a pilot program 
that promotes exchanges of immigration officials as part of 
an effort to streamline the APIS referral process, and seeks 
to identify and track suspected terrorists, fugitives, or 
smugglers. 
 
¶7. In June 2008, President Calderon signed into law a number 
of security and justice reforms. The security reforms granted 
police greater investigative authorities and facilitated the 
ability of law enforcement officials to seize the assets of 
individuals implicated in criminal activity. The justice 
reforms effected constitutional changes that provide for a 
presumption of innocence in criminal and civil prosecutions 
and allow for evidence-based oral trials promoting greater 
transparency and more confidence in the judicial system. The 
law provides for the identification of &control judges8 
invested with the authority to issue expeditious warrants for 
wiretaps or the arrest of targets of interest. Although these 
measures are primarily aimed at organized crime groups, the 
legislation also supports investigations against domestic or 
international terrorists. The government has eight years to 
implement the justice reform legislation adopted in 2008; to 
date, implementation has been slow and uneven. 
 
¶8.  The U.S. and the Government of Mexico have worked closely 
to implement a robust Diplomatic Security Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance (ATA) program with associated funding levels 
expected to rise from $503,000 in 2008 to $6 million in 2010. 
In 2009, ATA programs provided training for 300 Mexican 
 
MEXICO 00000027  003 OF 003 
 
 
security officials in 18 courses or seminars on matters 
ranging from VIP protection to digital security and forensics. 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
PASCUAL