VZCZCXRO2665
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0694/01 0560558
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 250558Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5876
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0008
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0295
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3135
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000694 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS AF
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER ATMAR DISCUSSES POLICE TRAINING; 
INSURGENT REINTEGRATION WITH AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE 

REF: KABUL 628 

Classified By: AMBASSADOR KARL EIKENBERRY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b & d) 

SUMMARY 
------- 

¶1. (C/NF) In a February 17 meeting, Interior Minister 
Mohammed Hanif Atmar told Ambassador Holbrooke, Ambassador 
Eikenberry, and General Caldwell that: 

-- he wants to train 2,000-3,000 police officer candidates 
outside of Afghanistan, each year for the next five years. 
Atmar is looking at Jordan, Turkey, and the UAE as possible 
training sites. 

-- while GIRoA cannot take reintegrated insurgents into the 
Army or Police, Atmar's plan for a local defense initiative 
(septel) and public companies for infrastructure and 
agricultural development would meet reintegrees' economic and 
security needs. 

-- Saudi intervention; the finalization of GIRoA's insurgent 
reintegration program; and the success of the Marjah 
operations would all move insurgent reintegration forward. 

-- while Atmar favors 16 weeks of training for police (which 
would enable full literacy training) he believes NATO 
Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A)'s plan for a condensed 
six week program as acceptable, providing the number of 
training hours remains the same. END SUMMARY 

INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FOR AFGHAN POLICE 
---------------------------------------- 

¶2. (C/NF) Noting that police growth is enormously 
constrained by a lack of trainers and training space, 
Minister Atmar wants to send 2,000-3,000 Afghan police 
officer (as distinct from enlisted) trainees to Jordan, 
Turkey, and the UAE for training each year for the next five 
years. Atmar's first choice is the International Police 
Training Center in Jordan, which has room for 1,000 trainees 
per year; facilities in Turkey and the UAE (Sharjah Police 
Academy and an under-utilized UAE military facility 100kms 
from Abu Dhabi) could take another 1,000 trainees each. 
Atmar estimates an annual cost of $3,000 to $4,000 per pupil 
per year (thus potential costs of $6 million to $12 million 
per year). Atmar wants Jordan to contribute by waiving the 
cost of the facility and the lodging; NATO/ISAF would pay for 
transportation, food, and training materials; and the cost of 
foreign trainers would be born by contributing nations. 

¶3. (C/NF) The Minister sees several advantages to this 
approach: European nations would be more willing to send 
police trainers to Jordan than to Afghanistan; the prospect 
of a year's training abroad would draw young, educated 
Afghans into the police officer corps; a generation of Afghan 
police officers trained overseas would help to break the 
ANP's culture of corruption; Atmar would also send two Afghan 
assistants for each international trainer, after three years 
these assistants would themselves be fully qualified 
trainers. Ambassador Holbrooke said he had already raised 
the issue with Jordanian Foreign Minister Judeh, who was 
positive and promised to follow up. NTM-A Commanding General 
LTG Caldwell told Atmar that UAE, through its Kabul Defense 
Attach, had made a formal offer to explore sending police 
trainers to Afghanistan. Atmar asked Ambassador Holbrooke to 
engage the Arab countries on Afghanistan's behalf, claiming 
that they would be more responsive to an American approach. 
Holbrooke agreed to do so, and asked Lt. General Caldwell to 
provide him with precise asks. 

REINTEGRATION REQUIRES JOBS AND SECURITY 
---------------------------------------- 

¶4. (C/NF) Minister Atmar said that hundreds of insurgents 
were approaching the government, and that a proper GIRoA 
response to them would have to address issues of justice and 
amnesty, political inclusion, economic and security needs. 
Noting that we cannot take them into the police and the 
army, Atmar seeks to address the final two factors by 
creating a Local Defense Initiative (not yet approved by 
President Karzai; see septel) and two large public sector 

KABUL 00000694 002 OF 002 


companies, focusing respectively on infrastructure and 
agricultural projects. Foreign aid in those sectors would be 
channeled through these public contractors, which would 
employ former insurgents (along with other Afghans) and 
provide them with limited job training (of a month or two) 
and a decent career. Atmar argued that microcredit won't 
work for insurgents; they must be employed in a controlled 
and well-managed manner. He estimated that the public sector 
companies could absorb 10,000 to 15,000 unemployed Afghans, 
including former insurgents who turned in their weapons, and 
former mujahideen disarmed through the Disarmament of 
Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) and Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. 

¶5. (S/NF) Atmar cited several factors that would move 
insurgent reintegration forward: Saudi intervention; the 
finalization of GIRoA's reintegration program; and the 
effects of the Marjah operation. Citing the arrest of Mullah 
Berader, Atmar said Pakistani help on two more arrests -- 
those of Mullah Mansoor of the Quetta Shura and Maulavi Kabir 
of Peshawar -- would further spur reintegration by showing 
Taliban that they could not rely on a Pakistani safe-haven. 
Atmar said contacts tell us that Berader was arrested 
because he was in favor of reconciliation. Noting that both 
the Chief of Army Staff, General Kayani, and ISI Director 
Ahmed Suja Pasha were out of the country when Berader was 
arrested, Ambassador Holbrooke advised Atmar that we should 
be careful of drawing conclusions. 

POLICE: QUALITY, QUANTITY, AND TRAINING LENGTH: 
--------------------------------------------- -- 

¶6. (C/NF) Noting that police training and quality are on 
my mind, Atmar said he favored expanding police basic 
training to sixteen weeks (from eight) so it could include a 
full literacy element. Ambassador Holbrooke asked Atmar to 
comment on the apparent divergence of opinion between this 
position and NTM-A's plan to condense police training from 
eight to six weeks. Atmar noted that a six-week program with 
the same number of hours as the eight week (as in NTM-A's 
proposal) would be acceptable; indeed, it would be necessary 
if Afghanistan is to meet its goal of 109,000 police by 
October 31, 2010. However, Atmar then proposed to square 
this circle by reducing attrition and increasing retention 
while the international community increased the number of 
trainers -- enabling Afghanistan to reach its growth goals 
while still providing a longer training course. 

¶7. (C/NF) Ambassador Holbrooke wondered if compressing the 
basic training curriculum from eight weeks to six would have 
a negative impact on quality, and wondered if 109k was an 
achievable target by October 30, 2010. The Minister said 
that a six week course would not lessen the quality of the 
force; recruits would accept the longer days, he said. He 
argued that the police were on track to meet the 2010 growth 
goals, with roughly 92,000 police currently on duty, and 
another 6,000 de facto police present but not counted on the 
rolls. These over-Tashkil police, Atmar explained, are not 
paid by the internationally-funded Law and Order Trust Fund 
for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and thus are not counted by LOTFA as 
official police. However, they are paid by private donors 
and customers (through MoI) for guarding projects like the 
Logar copper mine, Indian and Asian Development Bank road 
projects, and UN facilities. Atmar remarked that the 
shortages in the ANP ranks were most serious with officers 
and NCOs, but not as serious in patrolmens' ranks. 

¶8. (U) S/SRAP has cleared this cable. 
RICCIARDONE