VZCZCXRO2029
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241330Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3800
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0442
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000114 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: A REDUCED ROLE LIKELY BUT 
DETAILS WILL NOT COME QUICKLY 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 109 
   ...



250450,2/24/2010 13:30,10THEHAGUE114,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,09THEHAGUE759|10THEHAGUE108|10THEHAGUE10
9|10THEHAGUE97,"VZCZCXRO2029
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHTC #0114/01 0551330
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241330Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3800
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0442
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE
HAGUE 000114
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: A REDUCED ROLE LIKELY BUT
DETAILS WILL NOT COME QUICKLY
REF: A. THE HAGUE 109
¶B. THE HAGUE 108
¶C. THE HAGUE 097
¶D. 09 THE HAGUE 759
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Edwin R. Nolan for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The most immediate result of the February 20
collapse of the Dutch government (reftel B) is the absence of
a cabinet decision on post-2010 commitments to
ISAF/Afghanistan. In that absence, the default position,
withdrawal of Task Force Uruzgan by December 2010, stands.
It will likely be mid-March before the scope of authority of
the interim ""caretaker"" government is known. At best, it
will have limited decision-making capability on existing
mandates regarding Afghanistan. This will compel Dutch
forces to redeploy from Uruzgan beginning in August 2010.
While there may be political support for some commitment in
Afghanistan, there is no possibility of an extension as lead
nation of Task Force Uruzgan. The earliest possible
designation of a follow-on lead of Task Force Uruzgan will
provide the Dutch a partner for developing realistic joint
capabilities. Post recommends giving the Dutch time and
political space to develop consensus on their way ahead in
Afghanistan. We will look for opportunities over the coming
weeks to discreetly express our hopes for continued
meaningful Dutch military involvement in Afghanistan.
However, we need to remain cognizant of the fact that,
although the caretaker government favors an Uruzgan
extension, it is a minority government with highly limited
authority. We must be highly circumspect in becoming
involved in what could be an emotional election issue in the
coming months leading up to the June 9 parliamentary
election. END SUMMARY.
TOO SOON TO CALL ""NO DECISION""
------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) It is too soon to assume there will be a government
decision on Afghanistan, in part or in total, that will
result in a continued significant Dutch commitment. There
has been Christian Democrat (CDA)/PM Balkenende political
support for a commitment to Afghanistan, with the only
questions being types of missions, locations, and what, if
any, troop levels. There is no/no majority support for a
continuation of the mission in Uruzgan, and public opinion is
decidedly negative. On February 23, the Queen accepted the
resignation of all Labor Party ministers and asked the Prime
Minister to closely consult with parliament on &whether
there is support for subjects that cannot bear delay.8 Once
these consultations are complete, we will have more clarity
on what types of decisions the caretaker government will be
able to make. National parliamentary elections are scheduled
for June 9. The formation of a new coalition government
likely will take between two and nine months thereafter. The
Dutch cabinet and parliament likely will prefer to put off
some controversial decisions regarding ISAF/Afghanistan until
after the new coalition government is formed. However,
decisions on Afghanistan will influence what coalition can be
formed, as the coalition platform must be pre-agreed. Any
continued Dutch military mission in Uruzgan is virtually
certain to be among those issues deferred, according to Karl
van Oosterom, Senior Advisor to the PM. Meanwhile, other
Qvan Oosterom, Senior Advisor to the PM. Meanwhile, other
Afghanistan issues might be included in the list of subjects
that the Prime Minister and parliament agree &cannot bear
delay8 and need to be decided earlier by the caretaker
government. In that case, the caretaker government will need
to secure an ad hoc majority in parliament on each issue.
PARAMETERS OF EXPECTED COMMITMENTS
----------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Regardless of the fact that no decision has been
taken, the realities of the Dutch political landscape,
coupled with the limitations of the Dutch military, provides
a narrow range of possibilities regarding a future
commitment. The Dutch can be expected to provide training
through Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT), Police
Mentoring Teams (PMT), F-16 aircraft, intelligence elements,
headquarters staff elements, and development funding. The
commitment of assets to Uruzgan province, re-deployment of
THE HAGUE 00000114 002 OF 002
the Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) to another
province, or a significant commitment of troops (400 to 700)
to another mission will be the focus of the post-2010
decision. Although there has been support from opposition
parties to keep the PRT in Uruzgan with enablers and force
protection, there has not been support to extend as lead
nation of the Task Force, nor to extend a commitment for a
battle group. And, during the pre-election campaign period,
previous expressions of support could be modified or limited.
At best, there is a possibility, albeit slim, the Dutch will
keep their PRT in Uruzgan with a significant force protection
element of approximately 500 troops. Karel van Oosterom,
Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister, told the DCM February
20 that senior officials will be making ""discreet contacts""
with the USG and NATO on viable options that can demonstrate
a strong Dutch commitment to ISAF/Afghanistan.
PRACTICALITIES OF CURRENT MANDATE
---------------------------------
¶4. (C) The Dutch military will carry out their mission in
accordance with the current mandate. Although there is some
ambiguity, the mandate calls for the re-deployment of Task
Force Uruzgan beginning August 1, 2010, with completion by
December 1. The Head of Team Uruzgan at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs told POLMILOFF February 23 that although the
military has well-laid plans for re-deployment, the Chief of
Defense (CHOD) has indicated he is well aware of the fluidity
of the current situation and can adjust at any time to comply
with a change in tasking.
COMMENT
-------
¶5. (S/NF) COMMENT: The state of play within the Dutch
government will be unpredictable in the near term, with
consultations between the caretaker government and parliament
culminating in an agreed-upon scope of authority for the
interim government. Post believes it best to wait for these
initial decisions before speculating on future Dutch
commitments to ISAF/Afghanistan and recommending specific
courses of actions that may be irrelevant or unhelpful if
taken too soon. Post emphasizes that it will be virtually
impossible to solicit a Dutch commitment to extend their lead
of Task Force Uruzgan beyond the current mandate. The
earlier a Task Force Uruzgan lead nation successor is
announced, the greater the likelihood of obtaining any
substantial commitment by the Dutch to partner in Uruzgan.
Nonetheless, we must caution against any optimism that a
Dutch mission in Uruzgan can be expected. With a caretaker
government in place consisting of only Christian Democrats
(CDA) and Christian Union (CU) Ministers, official voices are
likely to be telling us what we want to hear. If in fact the
June elections enable a new center-right coalition to be
formed under PM Balkenende, new opportunities may open.
However, a Labor party victory with some type of center-left
coalition minus Balkenende, or even a broad centrist
coalition, is likely to allow only very modest Dutch
contributions. Accordingly, we believe, it would be
ill-advised for NATO planning to count on any Dutch military
presence in Uruzgan beyond December 2010. (Note: The
re-election of Balkenende as CDA party leader (in hope of a
Qre-election of Balkenende as CDA party leader (in hope of a
continuation of him as Prime Minister) has been viewed by
some political observers as compromising the CDA's prospects
in the upcoming Parliamentary election End Note)
¶6. (S/NF) For the immediate future, the Dutch should be given
time and political space to develop a consensus on
Afghanistan in this new environment. We should also refrain
from commenting publicly, unless asked to do so by the Dutch
themselves. The Dutch are intensely sensitive to perceptions
of outside meddling, and we must be discreet but clear in
approaching the interim government as well as relevant
political parties that will likely play a role in the future
government. We should be cautious that our approach does not
provide fodder for more radical elements of the Dutch
political scene, but we will actively engage across the
political spectrum for continued meaningful Dutch involvement
in Afghanistan. END COMMENT.
LEVIN